



## Extremism, Radicalisation, Citizenship

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# — Object and Method

Toulouse Métropole carries the European Rad2Citizen project supported by the European program of the Internal Security Fund. Rad2Citizen aims to work on the prevention of different types of radicalism (religious, trafficking, popular movements, identity movements) and associated violence.

This first analysis report aims at accounting for the achievements in terms of object definition and methodology. It will also provide a first analysis of the defined issues at a metropolitan level.

## Object: A series of definitions for analysing radicalisation

For more than half a century, the European construction seems to proceed together with a pacification of national and international relations. In such a context, the use of violence as a mode of expression was relegated to political and social margins. During the 2000', an inflexion can be reported. In fact, since the 9/11 attacks, forms of violence are being reinforced and amplified through their media resonance (Wieviorka and Wolton, 1987; Garcin-Marrou, 2001; Truc, 2016). These major events are challenging most nations at a global scale. At the same time, a deep social and political crisis seems to weaken citizen's trust on the ability of their administrations to protect them from social or physical threats (Foucault, 2019; . This crackling is happening while a global evolution is taking place on how people communicate, get informed and live together. It presents a series of breaches of different natures: social, generational, ethnic, politic etc.

The environment previously described is characterised by uncertainty and instability. It forms a ripe context for violent drift and social cohesion breakdown, especially among youngsters. These two horizons are what Rad2Citizen aims at preventing. At the same time, it is important to remind that uncertainty and instability can also present opportunities to collectively transform society (Boltanski, 2009).

Such a context requires an effort of definition that allows operational analysis of violence and radicalisation dynamics on a specified territory.

**Violence and radicality** will jointly design the object of our analysis as a horizon to prevent. The main commitment of the project is to prevent violent extremism, but its definition is harder than it appears at first sight (Khosrokhavar, 2018; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2009). At that stage, we suggest to reverse the expression in order to consider “violence” not only as a qualifier for “extremism”, which is difficult to circumscribe, but as the starting point of the reflection (Naepls, 2006). The focus will then be violence or, more precisely, violent acts, that is, acts defined by **an intentional and intense use of force, without consent of those towards whom the act is directed**. In order to reduce the field covered, and considering the prevention aspect of the project, we should limit our range of action to these violent acts that present a “cultural” or “political” aspect. “Cultural” here is not to be understood as an attribution to an identified pre-existing culture or subculture, but as learned ways to sense, think and act specific to one or more groups of interrelated persons. Thus, “cultural” refers to social and socio-cultural dynamics that compose the environment. “Political” will refer to shared and promoted narratives (ideological, religious, mythic...) regarding ways to live together.

We qualify as “radical” these forms of violence in that they appear as systematic and harm public safety and social cohesion.

**Radicalisation and extremism** will constitute a second couple. In relation with the existing literature, they will allow us to sharpen our sight upon specific phenomenon. On one hand, they imply a focus on the processual aspects and trajectories. On the other hand, they insist on anti-democratic forms of violence and the aims of those who use it. In RAD2Citizen by **extremism** we understand on the one hand processes of violent political radicalisation, on the other hand general systematic forms of violence that harm public safety and social cohesion.

Research distinguishes between two approaches that explain the rise of extremism: It regards local contextual explanations and ideological explanations (see Coolsaet 2019 in Kaya 2020, p. 23). Since WP3 reflects the local circumstances in various territories in Toulouse Métropole we consider primarily the first explanation, that we also can describe as socio-economic and political marginalization and grievances” (Kaya, p. 23).

## Territorial approach

As a monitoring instance linked to a specific territory, the WP3 cannot focus on individual situations of radicalisation. Some of these situations will be later used to better understand the phenomenon we are trying to grasp, nonetheless, this report is rather oriented toward a territorial understanding.

**Territory and environment** form the major conceptual couple for circumscribing the object. They define the observation scale and the type of data produced. They also define the reach of the actions and recommendations.

**Territory** is not only a reference to a geographical area. **It is a conceptual basis for understanding spatial dimensions of social experience** (Pesqueux, 2014). It is a highly political notion which calls for further discussions on identity, spatial structuration, social and socio-cultural dynamics of each area etc. Who lives and meets there? Who has influence on the territory and its inhabitants? How social cohesion and solidarity work at a local scale? These questions are necessary in a territorial approach.

**Environment** is at the same time a wider and more precise notion. Wider, it allows the integration of **non-material elements** *a priori* difficult to grasp from a territorial approach: online social networks, transnational solidarities or organised structures etc. More precise because it focuses on **what makes life possible in the city as a dwelling place** (Ingold, 2000)

In function of these definitions, what is our actual territorial focus? Rad2Citizen will analyse a two-scales area: as a metropolitan project, it will provide a general insight at the metropolitan level, focusing on population and problematics flows at this scale; however, a more precise analysis will be held on a series of local areas. The metropolitan analysis will be presented in the analysis reports (D3.3.) beginning with this one. The local areas will be analysed in local analysis reports (D3.6.). The local areas were selected in function of various criteria in order to constitute a diverse but coherent network. The detail of these criteria is given in D3.6.-1., it gathers very urbanised areas that concentrate most of the problematics and public efforts, central urban areas characterised by the flows of populations rather than by residential uses, peri-urban or even rural areas etc. This diversity should help us to work on different types of radical violence as defined above and allow an actual metropolitan view.

The explanations of radicalisation processes on the spatial level have many in common with (a lack) of social cohesion. Therefore, we argue that factors that foster social cohesion, in the same time have a positive effect on **early prevention** of extremism. There exist no direct causal relations between the lack of social cohesion and tendencies of radicalisation among the inhabitants of a district. Nevertheless, the literature agrees that we can assume a correlation (Miliopoulos 2018, p. 208).

The concept of **social cohesion** is relatively vague. Relevant factors that have an influence on social cohesion are (see Güntner 2009, p. 380, translation from the German by FHS): Social and political attitudes, beliefs and values, rights and duties, social capital and social networks within ("bonding") and between milieus and social groups ("bridging"). Socio-demographic "tendencies of social disintegration and the consolidation of material poverty in the cities" threaten social cohesion (Güntner 2009, p. 391, transl. FHS).

## Radicalisation phenomena and its explanations

Radicalization, especially among the youth, often grows within social groups. Radicalization of a group of people also requires a collective action (Kaya, p. 6). Motives for collective action within groups may be (according to Charles Tilly, in Kaya 2020, p. 6):

- Defensive mobilization (bottom-up)
- Offensive (top-down)
- preparatory mobilisation (top-down, for future threats or opportunities)

We consider defensive mobilization to be the main driver of radicalization processes in the context of social cohesion. Defensive mobilization is a reaction to a threat from outside, that might be stigmatization or a lack of perspectives. So, youths may react to exclusion and to a lack of participation by turning to radicalized groups.

Another theory of extremism differs three types of explanation (see Kaya 2020, p. 7)

- racial-physical ("criminalizing entire communities on the basis of the so-called racial differences", Kaya 2020, p. 7)
- psycho-pathological (individual psychology)
- socio-economic

In terms of early prevention, the psycho-pathological explanation may be fruitful. Keywords are: identity formation processes, groups as identity stabilizer, fostering the sense of belonging. Also, socio-economic explanations are important, that include: (economic) exclusion, perception of (collective) grievance, lack of political opportunities.

All of these concepts and explanations have in common that they are related to the dimensions of social cohesion as described above. As already mentioned, social cohesion is a relatively vague concept. Therefore, we fill it with some theoretical approaches, that are more developed:

- Subjective well-being, democracy and participation
- Five pillars of identity: questions of (collective) identity and collective grievance
- Social capital and spatial issues

## Subjective well-being, democracy and participation

In science, the question of how to measure the success of societies has been discussed for a long time. Values and goals play a decisive role in this. Under the catchword "Beyond GDP", attempts have been made for several decades to go beyond a purely economic view of societies. Since the 1960s, sociologists developed a variety of measuring instruments that attempt to fulfil this claim. The Human Development Index, happiness research, the concept of quality of life and similar approaches can be mentioned (Veenhoven 2000). The different approaches start from different focal points. Some focus on the individual well-being of citizens, others on environmental standards, equity issues, security or still economic indicators. However, they are all based on the idea that social cohesion is an important value. And all are committed in principle to liberal democracy and consider it an important component of social cohesion and quality of life. The connection between democratic principles and the stability and cohesion of societies has been and continues to be intensively researched (Frey und Stutzer 2000; Przeworski 2003; Weitz-Shapiro und Martins 2008). The concepts partly merge or complement each other. They have different emphases, but similar starting points.

In the political sphere, despite the dynamic development in the social sciences, GDP has long been held on to as the decisive indicator of prosperity, and still is to some extent today. Nevertheless, for some time now and especially through the ecological movements, politicians and parties have also discovered a stronger interest in broader instruments. In 2008, for example, the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy commissioned a high-ranking committee of scientists to develop an instrument to measure social success. The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (CMEPSP), referred to as Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission examined how wealth and social progress could be measured beyond GDP. The results then inspired the OECD to develop its OECD Better Life Index. It lists 11 dimensions of well-being: Housing, income, jobs, community (social networks), education, environment, civic engagement, health, life satisfaction, safety, work-life balance (OECD Better Life Index Website).

These or similar topics are also analysed in other instruments. Some of them emphasise the possibility of participation and democratic indicators more strongly. Others are particularly interested in a broadly understood quality of democracy, in which many aspects of individual freedom, equality etc. are included. The Democracy Barometer should be mentioned here among many others as a very well-founded instrument (Bühlmann et al. 2012). In the OECD Better Life Index, participation in democracy is summarised under the catchword civil engagement. However, this category is limited to only two indicators: voter turnout and participation of civic society in the legislative process. But the links between quality of life and political/democratic participation and the stability of societies are more diverse. For our question of social cohesion, various dimensions of quality of life play a role, especially those that promote inclusion in society. Political rights and political participation are particularly important. As Jane Jenson argued in an article for the UNESCO in 2010: Social cohesion means social inclusion (Jenson 2010, 4 f.).

Since most of the instruments mentioned refer to the level of nation states, the challenge is to find meaningful indicators for the local or regional level. The indicators we have selected reflect this. On the one hand, they are derived from the above-mentioned instruments with special attention to the aspect of social inclusion. On the other hand, they are chosen in such a way that they can be collected and analysed at the local level.

## Five Pillars of Identity

According to psychologist Hilarion Petzold (1990) identity is based on five pillars: (a) corporeality, (b) social networks, (c) work and accomplishments, (c) material security and (d) personal values. Behind every pillar is a basic human need: (physical and mental) health, belonging, self-efficacy, perspectives for the future and orientation. The different pillars are all interdependent and a (perceived) crisis in one can lead to difficulties in other pillars. For example, being unemployed (i.e. pillar “accomplishments and work”) can influence material security, one’s health and other pillars and vice versa. Also, a (perceived) crisis in one pillar can lead to overcompensation in another, that isn’t directly related to the one where the difficult situation is taking place: for example, feeling excluded from social networks can be compensated by focusing on certain values or focusing on sports etc.

On the one hand this concept helps practitioners who work with individuals in difficult situations to figure out where the individual is facing obstacles and lacking resources and on the other hand it can then be used as a basis to work on or find accessible resources needed to overcome certain hardships in life.

In the context of extremism this model is used by the Austrian “Extremism Information Center” to work with family members of and with individuals who became involved in extremist groups and/or acts. Extremist groups understand it very well to provide “resources” on all five pillars of identity: strength/power, belonging, recognition, self-efficacy, security, clear answers and orientation. Therefore, it becomes very difficult if one tries to challenge extremist ideologies by just focusing on their narratives without taking into account the psycho-social aspects and basic human needs of individuals who become attracted by extremist ideologies.

In our scientific approach we’d therefore like to take that approach and through quantitative and qualitative analysis try to figure out which factors may lead to radicalization and how society can provide resources against this process even before violence becomes manifest.

## Social capital and spatial issues

There are two types of social capital: social capital as personal networks of people (Bourdieu 1993) and collective social capital as institutionalized capital within a community, e.g. schools, churches, the public administration, a youth centre or a sports or cultural club (Putnam 1995).

Since social cohesion depends on these institutions, the latter will be regarded here. The main benefit of this sort of social capital is social trust, that means trust of the inhabitants of a community in society.

We further can differ horizontal groups and hierarchical organizations. For example, clubs or cultural organizations foster social cohesion and democracy, while organized crime doesn’t (Haug 1997, p. 32).

In WP3 we intend to reconstruct social capital within the relevant territories by the collection of organisations, clubs or institutions. They should be described as detailed as possible, under the leading question: (How) do they support social trust?

Social capital in the neighbourhood refers to places, where people meet. They are offers for discussions or even struggles. These struggles are important, when it comes to social cohesion.

We may differ two integration modes that are related to social cohesion:

1. Integration mode of integration by conflict“ (Sutterlüty 2010, p. 216, transl FHS)

## 2. Integration mode of urban indifference“ (Sutterlüty 2010, p.226, transl. FHS)

The latter seems to be free from conflicts, but it doesn't help to avoid the increase of hidden conflicts. So, in the end, it threatens social cohesion. In the first mode, on the other hand, conflicts are visible. They are part of the political live at local level. On the first view, such conflicts seem to be a social problem, but they help to avoid deeper confrontations and therefore have a positive effect on social cohesion. Where it comes to early prevention of extremism, institutions that allow and moderate conflicts are important.

Besides these visible institutions hidden institutions play a role, especially for youths. These are institutions that we don't think of on the first view, but which are important for the inhabitants of a district. Questions, that explain their importance may be:

Which meaning have these places for the inhabitants? Do they meet each other in a public park or at the shopping mall? Are they interested in clubs? Which ones? Who exactly meets (only a homogenous group or do various groups meet in the football club?)? Can they participate in shaping these public places and institutions?

Most important here is the subjective perception: We can differ physical infrastructure in the spaces from social spaces that are constituted by social network structures and the subjective meanings that people are giving them.

It is not easy to survey such subjective perceptions. The most fruitful way might be the reflection with youths for example in group discussion

## Methodology: General presentation

The analysis provided in the semester report will be structured in function of the data gathered. Due to their great diversity, their compilation and analyse will be held through a list of data “poles” or “pools” that will be built all along the project:

1. General Statistics (socio-demographic, employment/unemployment, Delinquency/criminality, socio-spatial and institutional...).
2. Public policies: reports, impacts, analysis, experience from frontline practitioners...
3. Policy makers, practitioners and inhabitants work groups
4. Problematic Situations and escalation phenomenon: case studies
5. Digital Social Network watch

## Detailed Methodologies

Here follows detailed methodologies by pool, for the pools already in march.

Pools 1 and 2 will be essentially based on a list of indicators proposed by FHS and validated among the partners. The list will be presented separately for each pool. Pool 3 and 4 will be based on differentiated methodologies depending on the specificities of each territories. These methodologies are being defined in relation with local policy makers and practitioners. Pool 4 is still to be defined.

### 1. General Statistics

Developing a territorial approach firstly implies to produce general knowledge of the territory to be explored. It is necessary to think scales and articulation issues. It also means that we will gather quantitative and qualitative data in order to produce descriptions of the local territories.

Based on a rich existing literature, we will try to explore all indicators that could link general life conditions and environment characteristics to the use of violence in a radical context.

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC	AGE
	GENDER
	FORMAL EDUCATION
	CITIZENSHIP
	PLACE OF BIRTH
	CITIZENSHIP or PLACE OF BIRTH PARENTS
ECONOMIC SITUATION	INCOME (HOUSEHOLD)
	POVERTY
	BIP per capita
	EMPLOYMENT
	UNEMPLOYMENT
	EMPLOYMENT CLASSIFICATION
HOUSING	CITY DISTRICT or QUARTER
	SQUARE METER per person
SECURITY	CRIME RATE (over time)
	CRIME RATE per district over time
	CRIME RATE per crime over time
	HOMICIDE over time
	POLITICAL VIOLENCE
	ORGANISED CRIME
POLITICAL SITUATION	VOTER TURNOUT on different levels
	VOTING RIGHTS
	DEMONSTRATIONS
	STRIKES
	OTHER FORMS OF PARTICIPATION

municipal- administrative (partly private)	Schools (may also be private)
	Kindergarten, Care Institution (for Children)
	Universities, other Educational Institutions
	Public housing agencies
	Old People's / Retirement Homes
	Nursing Home
	Hospital
	Medical Centres
	Labour Market Policy Measures
	Organisation of Political Participation (Youth Councils, ...)
	Public places and parks
Social services	Youth Centres
	Outreaching Youth Work
	Anti-Discrimination Office
	Social Counselling
	Housing Counselling
	Homeless Shelters
	(Un-)Employment Counselling
Public Transport	Buses, Metro, Train, Tram, ...
Private, religious, political	Political parties (youth organisations, youth work)
	Labour Unions
	Churches and/or religious Community Centres
	Associations/Clubs with social or counselling objectives
	Red Cross, ...
	Sports Clubs (with youth departments)
	Markets
	Commercial infrastructure (grocery stores, hairdressers, various shops, ...)

These indicators are not meant to “indicate” that one or another territory is “radicalised” nor than it could be a “breeding-ground” for radicalisation. They are oriented in order to provide general knowledge on specific and objective issues. They participate to the description of the territory and can be considered “clues” for understanding what is to live in these territories. These clues will have to be used to orient the other pools of data during their very production or to analyse possible differences between objective data and subjective experiences of the environment.

In that context, this first pool of data is both necessary and insufficient. It has to be articulated with the rest of the methodology which could let emerge new relevant indicators, let us consider some of the existing indicators as irrelevant etc.

To these general indicators, we added some more precise elements to be built as indicators in the course of the general study. The material for feeding these will be produced both with statistic data, case studies and focus groups. However, the aim will be to be able to report on these elements in a comprehensible way that, at the same time, accounts for the complexity of social reality. These indicators regard life satisfaction, life chances, trust toward politics and institutions, political values, perception of the environment and identification.

LIFE SATISFACTION	SATISFACTION with LIFE in GENERAL
	SATISFACTION with LIFE CHANCES
	SATISFACTION with INCOME
	SATISFACTION with LIVING STANDARD
	SATISFACTION with POLITICAL SITUATION

trust	INDICATOR
Trust	TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS
	INTERPERSONAL TRUST
	TRUST IN POLICE
	TRUST IN JUSTICE SYSTEM
	TRUST IN SOCIAL SYSTEM
	TRUST IN SOCIAL and YOUTH WORKERS
	TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
	TRUST IN CONSTITUTION
	TRUST IN POLITICIANS
	TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES
Political values	VALUE DEMOCRACY
	VALUE AUTHORITARIANISM
	VALUE EQUALITY
	VALUE DIALOGUE
	VALUE SOCIAL COHESION
	VALUE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
	VALUE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
	OTHER VALUES
	ACCEPTANCE OF VIOLENCE
	REPRESENTATION
PERSPECTIVES and IDENTIFICATION	PARTICIPATION
	FUTURE VISION INDIVIDUAL SITUATION
	FUTURE VISION SOCIETY AND POLITICS
	IDENTIFICATION WITH LOCAL COMMUNITY
	IDENTIFICATION WITH NATIONAL COMMUNITY
	FEELING AS OUTSIDER
	FEELING AS LEADER
	FEELING SELF EFFICIENT INDIVIDUAL LIFE
	FEELING SELF EFFICIENT SOCIAL LIFE
	FEELING SELF EFFICIENT POLITICAL LIFE

## 2. Public policies: reports, impacts, analysis, experience from frontline practitioners...

Preventing radicalisation is still an emergent issue. Its translation into public policies and concrete practices has to be analysed with at least two goals: first, these policies aim at transforming violence landscape and thus are part of this landscape. Second, the experimentations and initiatives in radicalisation prevention have to inspire us in order to better understand the processes of radicalisation themselves and their definitions. In fact, observing solely how different actors of prevention define their “horizon to prevent” and their methodology in order to achieve their goals has to be studied *per se* in order to better situate Rad2Citizen and articulate it to existing practices. This is especially necessary as Rad2Citizen aims at editing a handbook and training programs. Counter-narratives, social support teams, primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, all these terms have to be tackled in the context of their use.

For this purpose, a presentation of national, international and local policies will be done. In the first report, National policies will be the focus spot. Local policies will also be presented briefly in the first report but the focus on local actors and resources will be mostly brought in the second report. The third and fourth reports, depending on the material gathered, could also present more analytical parts about the political backgrounds and the effects of these policies both at a national and local level.

## 3. Policy makers, practitioners and inhabitants work groups

In order to grasp general trends in each territory, work groups will be organised with different types of actors directly involved in the area. These working groups aim at compiling and confronting direct experiences of the territory with inhabitants, associative actors, social workers, security professionals etc. As these actors partly already know each other and as their relations depend a lot of the specific history of each area, the focus group will be built in four steps.

First, we will be meeting institutional and associative representatives in order to ensure the access to frontline practitioners. These encounters will be taken as opportunities to first evoke the characteristics of the areas and the main issues known by the institutions.

Then, actual thematic focus groups will be held. These will gather frontline practitioners in order to precisely define the problematic situations and the issues that “radicalisation” approach can help to grasp and prevent. The first thematic will be “socio-educative professionals and radical violence”. In fact, frontline social workers and primary and secondary schools work in precious observation positions more often without a possibility to elaborate or interpret what they are confronted to. Gathering these actors will be a unique opportunity to have access to their experience and their knowledge. The second thematic will be “security”. As Rad2Citizen chose to focus mainly on violence as a horizon, security professionals will help us grasp the actual trends and dynamics of violence. National and local law enforcement professionals will be invited as well as security services of social housing. The last thematic group will be composed of associations and inhabitants. Depending on the most relevant actors on the territory, these groups will be composed of local violence prevention associations, cult representatives, sport associations etc.

The third step will be to gather cross-territories and cross-thematic working groups in function of the needs and issues brought by all the participants. Some of the actors are not used to be in contact

or their relations may not allow open discussions in other institutional spaces. These working groups will focus on fostering connections between them.

The last step will be to go back to a more institutional level to confront institutions' views with grass-rooted analysis. It will aim at detailing the analysis and at identifying potential changes or needs to be addressed at an institutional level (training, documentation, need of a referent in the institution...).

#### 4. Problematic situations reports / Escalation phenomenon

All along focus groups, specific situations may be mentioned. Although no personal information exchange will be allowed, we cannot exclude these situations and should analyse them in a specific pool of data. These collected first hand situations will complete other sources as could be institutional services dedicated to problem resolutions. As an example, Toulouse Metropole has a referent for radicalisation situations, National Education also gather laicity, radicalisation and sectarian phenomenon report forms, transport services do compile all incidents that happen on their network, some of these are linked to violent radicalisation etc.

The gathering of these data will take time as it is necessary to associate every local partner to the process. However, these sources could be of great importance in order to tackle radicalisation by its concrete manifestations and to compare it with our data on the territories, polarisation, vulnerabilities etc.

The analysis of the data should include the exact context of the occurrence and, if possible, elements of description of the actors' sociological trajectories and interactions.

#### 5. Digital Social Network watch

As mentioned in the object definition part, the concept of “environment” can be useful to include non-material elements that compose the life of the inhabitants and professionals. In that perspective, an analysis of online social networks and media (OSN) seems to be a necessity. This part of the observatory should include, if possible, both an analysis of the content and the use of the internet. Since the beginning of the 2000' some scientific contributions insist on the diversity of the internet or, more precisely, on the diversity of way to build, from the infinite technical possibilities, ways to use and exist on the internet (Miller and Slater, 2001; Casilli, 2010). In that sense, what exactly do reveal the many contributions on social media and radicalisation that focus on a construction of corpus done by its authors, without considering the actual composition of what we could call, after Appadurai (1996), mediascapes? We will keep in mind these analysis and initiatives (Hate Metter, Redirect Method...), but our first objective will here be to better understand the environment of TM inhabitants, which is a digitally augmented environment.

Thus, following methodologies of internet uses (Pangrazio, 2018), we will try to analyse the dynamics that can lead to phenomena as the “echo chambers” and “algorithm enclosure”, trying to avoid the approaches that, without knowing how exactly these dynamics work, tend to argue against “credulity” and “cognitive laziness”.

These analyses should help us to better grasp the life experience of inhabitants and the possible trans-spatial aspects that are at stake in their environment.

## First report: an overview

This first report will mainly contain the structure of the analysis that will be developed in next reports. We will focus on only two of the aspects: public policies and a presentation of the territory. The first part will help us understand how violent extremism and radicalisation have been tackled in France and more specifically in Toulouse and its periphery. This point is necessary in order to understand how Rad2Citizen is caught in a broader context, what are the potential resources to mobilise and what we can bring to reinforce radicalisation prevention in a spirit of complementarity. It is also important in order to understand how the definition of radicalisation itself was influenced by actual phenomena and by institutional and political dynamics.

The second part is a presentation of Toulouse Métropole. It includes statistical data (population, administrative structure etc.) and a first insight into local stakeholders' views on vulnerabilities, resources and radical violence.

# — analysis

## Public Policies - National Overview 1798-2021

### 1789-2000: First counter-terrorist frameworks

As a reminder we can notice that French legislation has long been grappling with terrorism. After having enshrined the term "terror" in the wake of the 1789 revolution, the French state was shaken by an anarchist "terrorist" movement in the **late 1880s**. These attacks gave rise to a first series of laws known as "rogue laws". These laws established the illegality of "indirect provocation" and "**apology for terrorism**". In particular, they targeted anarchist groups by prohibiting their gatherings and publications. The latter measures were repealed in 1992. **Apology however, remains prohibited.**

**In the 1950s**, the Algerian War (1954-1962) was fuelled by the multiplication of attacks organised by independence revolutionaries and anti-independence nationalists. Faced with this "modern war", the state of siege was not relevant; **the state of emergency was added to the legislative arsenal in 1955 allowing a strengthening, over a given period and territory, of the powers of the administrative police.**

**In the 1980s**, faced with a resurgence of terrorist attacks of various inspirations (FLNC, ETA, Charles Martel Group, Carlos...), France strengthened its control and intervention capacities **by the law of 9 September 1986**. It defines the concept of **terrorism as an "individual or collective enterprise with the aim of seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror"** and **draws procedural consequences**: extension of the duration of police custody to four days, postponement of the lawyer's intervention to the 72<sup>nd</sup> hour of police custody, increased penalties, compensation for victims, authorization of house searches without the consent of the suspects, exemption from penalties for criminals who prevent an attack from being carried out, etc. **The text creates a specialized body of investigating judges and prosecutors**, the Central Counter-Terrorism Service, commonly known as the 14<sup>th</sup> Section of the Public Prosecutor's Office, to handle all terrorism cases. For crimes of terrorism, trials before **professional magistrates** are instituted **at the criminal court of Paris, which** is an exception to the rule of trial before a popular jury. **This law and those that followed (1991-1992) established the exceptional nature of the treatment of terrorist cases and increased the severity of penalties.**

**The attacks of the 1990s**, particularly those perpetrated by the GIA between 1994 and 1996, gave rise to a new series of measures through the **Vigipirate plan**<sup>1</sup>. This plan represents a turning point as it is **the first set of measures oriented towards the protection and prevention of the terrorist risk**, no longer focusing on the capabilities of the perpetrators but on securing potential targets. This vigilance and prevention plan **was promulgated in 1995** and has several levels. It was supplemented in the following years, at the same time as law enforcement capacity was strengthened, in particular by the **creation in 1996 of the offence of Criminal Association in**

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1 <https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/vigipirate-levels>

**Relation to a Terrorist Undertaking (AMT)**, which makes the criminal assessment of attacks and planned attacks more independent.

The 2000s, marked by the large-scale attacks of 2001 (New York), 2004 (Madrid) and 2005 (London), saw mainly changes in intelligence and control capabilities with regard to **terrorist financing**, which became a crime in 2001, and **online content** (2006).

It should be noted that the preventive turn that presides over the shift in focus from "terrorism" to "radicalisation", which began in 2001 and was reinforced in 2005 in the Anglo-Saxon world and in some European countries (Denmark, Germany, etc.), was not taken in France until 2014.

## Jihadism, Europe and the turn of the years 2012-2015

The 2000s and 2010s saw the emergence of relatively new forms of terrorism in their ways of recruiting (international, online...) and their modes of action (undifferentiated targets, suicide attacks or confrontation with the police for the purpose of dying...). These forms of recruitment, which are essentially linked to jihadist terrorist groups (al-Qaeda, Daesh, etc.), destabilised European states, which seemed to (re)discover the possibility of a domestic threat in the name of a foreign cause after the London bombings. **These "new" terrorists described as "home-grown", raised the question of social cohesion and radicalisation** as much as that of the security threat. It is with this in mind that the first plans to prevent radicalisation have been developed in parallel with new repressive and protective measures, notably in the United Kingdom (2003) and Denmark (2007).

In France, however, the measures taken between 2000 and 2014 remained essentially extensions or reinforcements of the existing frameworks. While the 2012 attacks in Toulouse and the increase in the number of departures to the Iraqi-Syrian combat zone gave rise to new concerns, **it is not until 2014 that a first plan** that still struggles to fully recognise the "prevention of radicalisation" emerged in France.

**This first plan, presented in April 2014, is called the Plan Against Terrorism (Plan de Lutte Anti-Terroriste - PLAT).** It has four components:


1. Countering the movement of terrorists;
2. Active fight against jihadist networks;
3. International cooperation;
- 4. Countering the preachers of hate.**

This plan containing general guidelines was implemented through various circulars in the following months. Among them, the **circular of 29<sup>th</sup> April 2014** addressed to prefects (representing the central State in French circumscriptions) is essential as it defines the structure of the policy of prevention of radicalization as a **decentralized policy at the departmental level**, coordinated at the national level by the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime (CIPDR, led by the Ministry of the Interior, "and Radicalisation" is added to its title only in 2016) and the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit (UCLAT - National Police).

At the national level, the 2014 plan leads to the **creation of a platform: the National Centre for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalization** (Centre National d'Assistance et de Prévention de la Radicalisation - CNAPR, managed by UCLAT). This platform includes a toll-free hotline and a website (stop-jihadism.fr) that provides advice and centralizes the processing of reports of people in the process of radicalization or at risk of radicalization. After an initial check by the intelligence services (DGSI), **the reports are transferred to the departmental prefects** responsible for setting

up two bodies: a Departmental Evaluation Group (GED) ensuring security management, and a Prefectural Unit for Prevention and Family Support (CPRAF) providing medical and social monitoring to suitable situations. These CPRAFs are set up at the discretion of the prefect, but generally comprise a core group consisting of child protection, judicial youth protection, the regional health agency, the family allowance fund, etc. The CPRAFs are also responsible for the provision of health care and social services.

# DISPOSITIF NATIONAL ET TERRITORIAL DE PRÉVENTION DE LA RADICALISATION



With the PLAT, the fight against terrorism, which was previously a political matter exclusively of national, police and legal competence, has become a decentralized and cross-sectoral policy to the point that some observers speak of "great de-partitioning".

In addition to the actors present in the CPRAF, the specific nature of the support considered (sectarian aberrations, security issues, etc.) leads to the specialization of professionals, essentially from the field of child protection. These teams, generally known as **Listening and Support Cells (Cellule d'écoute et d'accompagnement - CEA)**, are monitoring situations at departmental level. In addition, **since May 2015**, the CPRAFs that do not have such a team have been able to benefit from the **support of a mobile intervention team**. Initially carried out by the CPDSI (Centre for the Prevention of Sectarian Aberrations Linked to Islam), this mission has been carried out since 2017 by the Sauvegarde 93, a child protection association located in Paris suburb, and the Artemis association, a member of the SOS group.

In parallel with these developments, the **Reports' File for Terrorist Radicalisation (FSPRT)** was created in March 2015. This file partly overlaps with the "S files" used by intelligence services to track individuals who may pose a threat to State security. Registration in the FSPRT is not systematic with each alert.

**The attacks of January and November 2015** in the Paris region shook the national community and, while they confirmed the relevance of the 2014 plan, they also gave rise to initiatives with a less fortunate destiny. The two examples presented below help the understanding of a **few points of tension** beyond the consensus for the fight against terrorism and radicalization, on **the definitions of these terms and the means of preventing them**, particularly with regard to freedom of conscience, expression and international law.

Following the attacks of November 2015, a **constitutional review** is prepared. It concerns two points: a **modification of the state of emergency and its inclusion inside the constitution**, and **the extension of the possibility of forfeiture of nationality for binational citizen born in**

**France.** The second point rose the most heated discussions. Within the government itself, the measure takes, for its defenders, the form of a symbolic measure of excommunication, of exclusion from the national community, while its detractors denounce its limits in terms of application, its discrepancies with international law and its ineffectiveness in front of people who have already renounced their affiliation to France. After a few weeks of public debate, the entire reform was abandoned.

Second example: **the law of 3 June 2016** stipulates a 3-year custody sentence for "**habitually consulting an online public communication service that makes** available messages, images or representations either **directly provoking the commission of terrorist acts or the apology of such acts**". **The Constitutional Council**, seized by a priority plea on constitutionality, censured this possibility on 10 February 2017, considering that the provisions of the article "**infringe on the exercise of freedom of communication** which is not necessary, appropriate and proportionate". The text, slightly amended, reappeared in a law of 28 February 2017. The amendments concern on the one hand a narrowing of the spectrum making it necessary to "manifestly adhere" to the ideology expressed, and on the other hand the exclusion of the criminalisation of consultation of these services for "legitimate reasons". **Once again referred to the Constitutional Council in October, the measure is finally declared unconstitutional and definitely abandoned in December 2017.**

### Continuity of prevention plans (2016; 2018)

Two other plans completed the PLAT. They were redacted in a more achieved form, structured in various axes and declined in concrete measures.

**In May 2016, the Action Plan against Radicalization and Terrorism (PART)** is presented to the press by the Prime Minister. It is a 68-page document, compared to 2 pages for the PLAT. The PART is organised into 7 axes divided into 80 measures in total.

1. **Detecting radicalization trajectories** and terrorist networks as early as possible. This area mainly concerns the organisation of intelligence, particularly prison intelligence, and information sharing. It also aims at a certain systematisation of the methods used to deal with persons reported.
2. **Monitor, hinder and neutralize** terrorist networks. Mainly concerns judicial measures and administrative surveillance and obstruction.
3. **Fighting terrorism in its international networks and sanctuaries.** Concerns actions to be carried out abroad.
4. **Increase the number of measures to prevent** radicalisation in order to ensure **individualised care for** the public. It is the most developed focus, declined in 20 measures aimed at building capacity at the territorial level. It concerns in particular national education, associations and municipalities, reinforcing the cross-sectoral and localized nature of the system. In particular, it is up to mayors to produce an amendment to the city contract concerning the prevention of radicalization.
5. **To develop** applied **research in the** field of counter-discourse and to mobilize the Islam of France. Provides the establishment of a permanent Scientific Council (COSPRAD).
6. Better **protect vulnerable sites and networks.** In line with Vigipirate.
7. To know how to react to any terrorist attack and demonstrate the **resilience of the nation.** Mainly concerns the capacity of law enforcement agencies and the care of victims.

With this plan, the doctrines of counter-terrorism and prevention of radicalization are largely intertwined. This plan is the most integrated mechanism from this point of view and confirms the trend that will be in place in 2014.

**In February 2018, a third plan is presented by the Prime Minister: the National Radicalisation Prevention Plan (PNPR)**<sup>2</sup>. Lighter than the previous one, this plan is structured in 5 axes declined in 60 measures for about thirty pages.

1. **Protecting minds from radicalization.** Essentially concerns the establishment of counter-discourse in national education and the implementation of citizenship education programs. Also emphasizes online content.
2. **Complete the detection/prevention mesh.** This axis aims to involve in the "meshing" sectors that have been little invested up to now: sport, University, business, etc.
3. **Understanding and anticipating the evolution of radicalization.** Reinforces the PART points on COSPRAD and foresight.
4. **Professionalize local actors and evaluate practices.** Aims both at broadening the actors concerned (mental health, social workers, etc.), reinforcing their training and building the capacities of actors who are already specialised. Insists, in the evaluation, on the mobilisation of scientific references and the sharing of experience.
5. **Adjust disengagement.** Insists on certain categories of public requiring differentiated care: returnees from combat zones, people under the control of the justice system, etc.

Two elements may raise awareness in this plan: **the shift from the notion of deradicalization to that of disengagement** takes distance from the work of Dounia Bouzar (CPDSI) and shifts the focus from the underlying ideology to the engagement of young people in groups and violent action. This orientation is partly the result of studies conducted since 2016, notably by the research institute of the Ministry of Justice (INHESJ), and on an alignment with certain international experiences, notably that of RAN and CPRV-Quebec.

The second, more significant element **is the evacuation of the counter-terrorism component**. Three causes can be put forward to understand this absence: this security aspect continues to develop but is once again becoming independent of the prevention of radicalisation. **It is the subject, in parallel with the PNPR, of a law on homeland security and counter-terrorism (SILT, 2017) and of a Counter-Terrorism Action Plan (PACT, 2018)**<sup>3</sup> focused on the issues of hindrance, protection of potential targets, legal action and European cooperation. The defeats of the Islamic State Organization in Syria have reduced its attractiveness and the risk of large-scale attacks on national territory. A third point: **inherited from the fight against terrorism, the prevention of radicalisation, from 2016 onwards, both catalyses numerous topics and shapes a new structure for security, violence prevention and social cohesion policies.**

## Outlook (2021 - ...)

Over the last six years, the prevention of radicalisation has brought together many actors, scales and topics in French public life. The PLAT, PART and PNPR have established a strong link between social cohesion, vulnerabilities, radical offers and national security. From 2014 in the most

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2 [https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/PNPR\\_English\\_final\\_sansmediakit.pdf](https://www.cipdr.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/PNPR_English_final_sansmediakit.pdf)

3 <http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/uploads/2018/10/20181004-plan-d-action-contre-le-terrorisme-anglais.pdf>

specialised circles, this compilation has been the subject of various discernment practices. Let us highlight two lines of rupture which preside over a strong tension in the development and implementation of public prevention policies.

### *From radicalisation to violence*

Considering the problem of radicalisation to be both ideological (extremism) and behavioural (violent), it should be noted that the relationship between these two poles have never been clearly defined (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013) and is ultimately at stake in the work of discernment of support professionals (Bertrand, 2020; Weert & Eijkman, 2019). These professionals, mainly social workers, do not have a tradition of "ideological" work and are constantly moving on the fine line between social work and an attack on freedom of conscience and religion. Thus, **it is often the issue of violence** (and the involvement in social groups that may lead to it) **that is favoured by these professionals as a gateway.**

This in no way excludes work on ideological confinement, but leads to a shift from jihadist terrorism to all the cultures of violence that affect the territories observed: racist violence, 'right' or 'left' extremism, violence linked to drug trafficking, escalation of violence with law enforcement agencies etc. This focus is only marginally visible in the public arena, but actively structures the operational response to the issues observed at the local level. It still seems to remain in the gap between the prevention of delinquency and the prevention of violence, and continues to focus on the specific issue of **"radicalisation", which essentially consists of identifying processes of control and forms of violence which have the particularity of structuring certain groups and strongly impacting social cohesion in the territories where it is present.**

### *From radicalisation to violence*

In parallel with the shift toward the issue of violence, the government's policies have taken on a different focus, aiming to resolve a latent tension since the emergence of Jihadism, and even since the 1980s, over specific Muslim affiliations, particularly so-called Quietist Salafism. In order to get around the issue of violence, an emerging vocabulary has been mobilised since 2018, first around **"communitarianism"** and then, since 2020, around **"separatism"**. These two terms refer to **networks deemed closed and advocating values and ideas that contradict the "values of the Republic"**. In this respect, the development from Emmanuel Macron's Mureaux's speech (02/10/2020) to the bill "reinforcing the respect for the principles of the Republic" is symptomatic of the difficulties in circumscribing what is to prevent.

Mureaux' speech clearly aims at paving the way for in-depth work on **citizenship and belonging to the "national community"**. Many directions are exposed as to be explored and the foundations are laid: citizenship, secularism, and the primacy of the principles and laws of the republic over any other form of organisation of social life. At the same time, the obstacles to the strengthening of this "nation of citizens" are expressed in the expression **"Islamist separatism": "a conscious, theorised, politico-religious project, which takes shape through repeated deviations from the values of the Republic, which often results in the constitution of a counter-society and whose manifestations are the dropping out of school for children, the development of community based enclosed sporting and cultural practices which are the pretext for teaching principles that do not conform to the laws of the Republic."** This discourse brings into coherence two

distinct elements: on the one hand, the definition of new illegalisms, that is, positive principles likely to become law, and which cannot be directly oriented "against" a population (we shall return to this point later), and on the other hand, a specific "threat" which would underlie and precede these "manifestations". This threat, which will soon become an "enemy" for the intelligence services (Lauren Nunez, Intelligence Services Coordinator, 16 February 2021), is explicitly named Islamist separatism.

### **Bill confirming the principles of the Republic**

The bill presented on 9 December 2020 by the government is in line with the speech of Les Mureaux. It borrows the main thrusts, but marks a slight shift. Firstly, the term "separatism", which is not consensual enough, is abandoned (although it remains politically active) in favour of "**strengthening the values of the Republic**". These 'values', whose content can only be subjective (what is valued), are replaced by 'principles' during the parliamentary debate, allowing for better conformity with the constitution and legislative use. The bill is then organised into five main areas:

1. Measures of **public order and neutrality** of the public service
2. **Associations**: reinforcement of controls, contract for the respect of the principles of the Republic
3. **School**: compulsory education, home schooling, end of the ELCO system
4. Structuring of **Islam in France**, end of detached imams, foreign financing, putschs in mosques
5. Bringing the Republic back into the real world: **republican reconquest of territories**

We shall present more in detail the content of the law and debates that emerged in the course of its institutional trajectory when it will be finally voted, in D3.3.-2 or -3.

### **Cells for Fighting Islamism and Community Closure (CLIR)**

In parallel with the steps taken to enshrine these issues in positive law, which leaves little room for the designation of "threats", and even less room for the designation of "enemies", a few more discrete initiatives are worth noting. These are measures and actions that are the exclusive responsibility of the executive power, within the limits of its prerogatives. These initiatives benefit from greater freedom to define their orientations but are limited as regards the levers at their disposal to accomplish their missions. It is besides from these experiences that the bill has been largely inspired by.

In 2018, fifteen districts are labelled "**republican reconquest districts**". These districts benefit from police reinforcements and a policy of attempting to adjust police-population relations. This experimental programme is also the object of discrete collaborations around 'communitarianism' and 'separatism', which lead to various experiments on the targeting and hindering of the 'radical sphere' (cf. N. Belloubet's speech of 21/11/2019). **The generalisation of these experiments gave rise, by the circular of 27 November 2019, to the installation in all departments of the Prefectural Cells for the Fight against Islamism and Community Closure (CLIR).** These cells bring together certain GED and CPRAFS actors and have the following mission (source: CIPDR):

- The establishment of a **diagnosis of the state of Islamism and community withdrawal** in the department, a shared mapping is drawn up, allowing a cross-cutting approach and a wider transversal vision.

- The **centralisation and sharing of confidential information on the phenomena of Islamism** and community withdrawal. This information comes both from the state administrations present in the field and from elected representatives and other local actors.
- The **undertaking of controls** on the basis of the information gathered, under the authority of the justice system and within the framework of the powers of the general or special administrative police force.
- The definition and **proposal of a support strategy** or alternative offers, to enable a return to republican values and principles, in conjunction with elected representatives, local authorities and partner associative structures.

In concrete terms, these cells have a control function on previously identified sites: "This may involve controlling regulations on establishments receiving the public or on hygiene, controlling the regulation of sporting activities, controlling the regulation of the reception of minors or combating fraud." (C. Castaner, Prefects' seminar on the fight against Islamism and community withdrawal, 28 November 2019).

On 21 January 2021, here are some results (source: press file of 26/01/2021):

Government results since 2018

- ▣ TOTAL inspections carried out since February 2018 (Plr-Q + Clir) = 19,921 structures inspected
- ▣ GENERAL TOTAL of closures since February 2018 (Plr-Q + Clir) = 452 pronounced closures
- ▣ TOTAL recoveries since February 2018 (Plr-Q + Clir) = 39.2 million euros

From the 1970's to 2021, we can observe a complexification of the issues treated by public policies. First, they were labelled as "fight against terrorism", then this "fight" was considered insufficient and had to coexist with "prevention" issues, about terrorism or radicalisation, the latter still not being a legal infraction or category. The recent emergence of a still unstable vocabulary (communitarianism, separatism, values of the republic...) leads us to think that the deep roots of these politics have still not been named in a satisfactory way. Hence, we will have to keep attentive to new developments and labels in order to grasp in the more complete way those of the public policies that potentially aim at preventing what we call radicalisation.

## Local Policies: an overview since 2012

Local policies analysis is a central part of Rad2Citizen. In order to present it in a way that allows public policies orientations and their application, it will be developed on the course of the project and synthesised in D3.3.-1 and D3.3.-3. By “local, we here understand policies that took place at a department level (Haute-Garonne – 31) and for Toulouse Métropole. Specific local analysis at a municipal/district level will be analysed in D3.6.

Little sources exist for such an analysis. Very few academic studies review local public policies, and fewer do it with first-hand data and in an evaluation perspective. A report was published in 2017 for the senate and tackles “de-indoctrination, the de-recruitment and reintegration of jihadists in France and Europe”. It presents an important limit of time (2017) but its annex contains the only publication of radicalisation prevention financing program (for 2015-2016), up to today. This documents and other minor written sources will dialogue in this analysis with some data given in the course of meetings and interviews with the authorities in charge of the prevention of radicalisation.

### 2012-2014

**Very few data exist on this period.** However, it is necessary to include it into our analysis in order to understand a specificity of the territory: it carries **the memory of the first “homegrown” terrorist attacks in France**. Contrary to Spain (2004) or United-Kingdom (2005), France refused to engaged military against Iraq in 2003 and thus tempered its quality of military aim for terrorist organisations. However, this truce was not to last. In 2012, Mohammed Merah, a young man living in a district of Toulouse, attacked three targets: a soldier, a man at a cash machine, and a group of children in a Jewish school. **This event astounded all the country and marked the return of terrorism issues**. Although no public policy emerged at that time, it is interesting to keep in mind that this event deeply structured the approaches of terrorism and radicalisation prevention in Toulouse. In fact, numerous actors met during Rad2Citizen activities mentioned it, for different reasons. The actors in charge of the district of Les Izards, where Merah was born and raised specifically reacts to this memory by mentioning it while trying to avoid to develop on the topic. They participate to a will to struggle against the stigmatisation of the district, both form Merah’s memory and more recent problematics linked to drug trafficking. This includes a partly renaming of Les Izards, in Trois-Cocus. In 2019, two sites were elected to receive the names of Imad Ibn Ziaten, the soldier killed in 2012, and the victims of the shooting at Ozar Hatora school.

The analysis of this specific memory will be strengthened and developed in later reports.

### 2015-2020

The installation of the CPRAF at a department level in 2014 gave birth to a series of features for supporting families and radicalised people. One of the missions was to **support the families of the youth gone to Syria**. This team was organised by an association: *Syrien ne bouge agissons* (If nothing moves, let us act. A play on words between the homophony between “syrian” - syrien, and “if nothing” - si rien). This association received 5.000€ in 2015 and 10.000€ in 2016 for this mission. Another mission consisted in **the support of the people reported for potential**

**radicalisation.** In 2015, a first team held this mission with 50.000€. It was led by an association: The Regional association for preventing and helping dependant and excluded people. In 2016, this mission was entrusted to another structure: The Regional association for the safeguarding of childhood and adolescence for 35.000€. It is important to note that, at this time, a national team also intervened on these missions, led by the CPDSI. In 2016 however, the CPDSI stopped its activities as a national support team.

After 2016, the actors for these two missions did not stabilise. France Victime 31, specialised in the support of victims, held the “family support” mission for some years. Another association held the “youth support” mission until 2020. It is currently being replaced by another associative actor in articulation with Toulouse Métropole.

In parallel to these initiatives of secondary and tertiary prevention, **other local actors were mobilised for primary prevention.** These efforts can be funded internally by the institutions or benefit from the **FIPD (Interministerial Fund for delinquency prevention)** which is partly operated at a local level and contains a strong “radicalisation prevention” envelope. In 2020, 15.600.000€ were dedicated to radicalisation prevention (4.315.600€ approx. in 2015; 4.000.000€ approx. in 2016).

First of all, considerable efforts in **trainings** have been done. Toulouse Métropole, the Conseil Départemental (Departmental Council), the Academy of Toulouse (representing the national education minister at a local level), the CAF (Family benefits fund) and many others institutions organised different types of training programs: conferences on “terrorism”, trainings on laicity, trainings on what to do when confronted to a radicalisation situation etc. As an example, in **Toulouse Métropole 75 agents participated to a three days training in 2019, then again in 2020. Due to sanitary situation complications, less agents participated in 2021 but the training was maintained.** It represents more than 20.000€ per year, a cost shared between Toulouse Métropole and the Prefecture in 2019 and 2021. Other specific and less expansive seminars were organised. Many institutions integrated these trainings to their training plans between 2015 and 2018.

The bill “comforting republican principles” will reinforce this aspect as it will turn compulsory the training on laicity for every public agent.

In particular, the **Conseil Départemental** developed, since 2016, a program in direction of the secondary schools. This program “Parcours Laïque et Citoyen” (PLC – Citizenship and Laicity Trajectory) began with few resources, financing local associations and structures to intervene with pupils and education professionals. The program was then developed until today. In 2020, the PLC is materialised as a 300 pages catalogue at the disposal of every secondary school. This catalogue contains a thematic list of possible interventions fully or partly funded by the Conseil Départemental. Here is the list of the topics:

- Alterity/Living together (76 interventions proposed)
- Plastic arts/visual arts (17 interventions)
- Scientific culture (6)
- Debates (13)
- History/Memory (27)
- Games/Sport (14)
- Literature/Theatre/Poetry (58)

- Media/Internet (36)
- Music/Danse (14)

These 261 propositions are all oriented toward citizenship and laicity and mobilised 146.000 pupils and more than 174 associations and partners since 2016. In addition to the funding by the Conseil Départemental (more than 900.000€ in 2019-2020), co-findings can be put in place, extending the global envelop for this project. According to one of the responsible of the PLC, it already covered 95% of the secondary schools in the department and should be extended to late primary school from 2021 on.

In 2017, the local **public prosecutor's department** decided to orient its effort toward prevention by enlarging an existing feature to terrorism apologies. Taking as a basis, the “local group for delinquency treatment” (GLTD), it set a possibility to change specific penalties into “citizenship trainings”. Days after Samuel Paty's assassination on October 21<sup>st</sup> 2020, this feature benefited to people prosecuted for apology of terrorism. Little data are available but it seems that this possibility is extending.

The **national family benefits fund** (CNAF) publishes every year since 2017 a call for projects that is operated at a local level (CAF). In 2017-19 three axes were considered relevant for radicalisation issues: parenthood, republican values, radicalisation/digital education. Since 2020, five axes exist:

- Parenthood
- Counter-narratives
- Republican values
- Living together
- Digital education

The agents interviewed noted an important tension inside the institution between “detection” of radicalisation cases and “living together” efforts. Regarding the five axes, it looks clear that the second point is dominant. In 2017, this program represented 17.000€ for a total of 10 actions. In 2020, the program developed a lot and represent 110.000€ for 20 actions. This fund partially compensated the lack of FIPD local orientations for 2020.

Both at a national and a local level, radicalisation prevention policies have developed and evolved a lot since 2014. From counter-terrorism to targets protection to proper prevention, **it does not seem to be stabilised yet**. What is to prevent and how to do it are still animating the public debate and the responses are diverse: radicalism, violent actions, extremism are all terms which are not synonymous and do not lead to the same outcomes. More than defining a prevention policy as a doctrine, we chose here to present the main trends that marked prevention of radicalisation.

However, it does not look pointless to try to enter the very process of application of the general policies, this is what local analysis allows to do. **By comparing initiatives through time and between different actors, it is possible to draw a more precise picture of how these policies work**. In fact, local declinations and experiments show that **each actor adapted, sometimes with important modifications, the national doctrines** both to its core missions and in order to maintain a more stable basis, less dependent of political discourses and struggles. In that sense, none of the stakeholders met mentioned separatism, except the representatives of the state (prefecture). Some of them also rejected that term, and more generally the focus on beliefs and ideologies in particular, as they were willing to focus on violent actions only. **Other actors tend to reject the term**

**“radicalisation” but put in place prevention policies under other notions:** laicity, citizenship, social cohesion, enrolment etc. That participate to the global effort and are funded by these funds. Considering these aspects, Rad2Citizen should not be thought as an external actor but as an active stakeholder in prevention of radicalisation. By soliciting local actors, policy makers and front-line practitioners, **it carries a certain view of what is radicalisation and how to prevent it.** Our approach does have an effect on our partners, that should be the object of further analysis.


# Toulouse Métropole : First insight for understanding a territory

## Main characteristics of the territory: a metropolis

In France, most metropolis are very recent (2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2010', MAPTAM law in 2014), in Toulouse Metropole case: 2015. This can be partly explained by the strength of municipalities in the French territorial model. Although France is known to have a very centralised political system, the force of municipalities actually tends to produce a sort of polarisation that difficult the work or emergence of middle-scale institutions. Hence, inter-municipal institutions were often built in a way that lower its capacity to overcome the political and institutional force of the municipalities. They were very little integrated. **Still today, the suspicion that the metropolis are political trojans for the centre-city are strong and their integration and delegation of authorities limited** (Galimberti, 2019). Nonetheless, Toulouse Métropole has many missions, among which urbanism, sport development, housing, heritage valorisation and solidarity, which includes delinquency prevention, youth prevention and access to rights.


Toulouse Métropole is a public establishment for intermunicipal cooperation (EPCI) which regroups 37 municipalities, mostly urban, for a total estimated population of 780.995 inhabitants in 2020. **Toulouse, the centre-city, weights for 50 % of the population and elected members of the Metropolis** which did not absorb any city in its constitution. The urban area of Toulouse is the 4th most populated in France, after Paris, Marseille-Aix-en-Provence and Lyon. The following pages will be aimed at analysing **structure and dynamics of population** in the Metropolis considering it as a **heterogeneous environment, thus subject to distinctions and inequalities** (Sellers *et al.*, 2008; Galimberti *et al.*, 2017)

The composition of the metropolis' population is younger than the average in France:




In terms of age, however, the population is not equally distributed. Most of the 18-39 years old population is concentrated in the centre city and its close periphery, where most universities and economic activity are located. 0-17 population is more present in the exterior of Toulouse, especially at the east. Finally, 65-80+ population is concentrated in the west periphery of Toulouse. This distribution seems to correspond to a geographical specialisation inside the metropolis between activity, family and education, and retirement.


### Effectifs de population 3-10 ans



### Effectifs de population 65-79 ans



### Effectifs de population 25-39 ans




Regarding the composition of the population in terms of strangers' rates, the same conclusions can be made than for 25-39 years old population. Toulouse is the most attractive city of the metropolis for strangers with 10,8% of its population in 2016, which can be explained in part by its university campus and economic activity. Colomiers (10%) and Blagnac (7,8%) also present important rates of strangers as they concentrate a great part of the industrial aero-spatial activities.

From the data presented so far, we can think that there is **a great distinction between an attractive and active centre and a more residential periphery**, also as a specialisation of specific areas. To strengthen this hypothesis, we can look at a lot more of indicators. The ones to be presented here on will help us understanding the centre-periphery dynamics. Two indicators are especially relevant to that point: the home-to-work flows and the long terms flows of population. On the first point, it is to be underlined that there are intense flows between Toulouse and its periphery, and relatively low flows between peri-urban cities.

On the second point, the indicator will be the long- and short-term residents of the different areas. In fact, in Toulouse, and especially in the centre of Toulouse, most residents are short or mid-term residents whereas outside Toulouse, the contrary is observed.

In order to better understand residential strategies at a metropolitan scale and bring some elements of comprehension to what have been written so far, more detail is needed regarding the structuration of economic activity and the employment market.


The employment area of Toulouse is the location of the majority of the **aerospace sector's** salaried employees in the south-west of France. Reciprocally, Toulouse employment area is dependent on the dynamism of the aerospace industry, since 1 employee out of 5 works for a company in the



sector. This strong specialisation is due in to the presence of the aeronautical manufacturers and space prime contractors, major industrial equipment manufacturers (Liebherr, Latécoère, Thales, Rockwell, etc.) and engineering and IT services companies (Altran, Alten, Assystem, Akka, Sogeti, Capgemini, CS, Scalian, etc.). The following map shows the geographical repartition of employment poles in the metropolis:


TM suffers more unemployment than national average in pre-COVID 19, and is expected to suffer a very hard impact as its dependence to the European Aeronautical pole weakens its dynamism while aerial companies' activity declined a lot.

According to INSEE, unemployment rate in 2017 was of 17% for Toulouse, 14,7% for TM and 13,9 for France. In September 2020, a study from Pôle Emploi, the public institution in charge for employment in France, underlined that the employment area of Toulouse was one of the most impacted by COVID-19 crisis in the region Occitanie. It went through an important decrease of employment offers which was not compensated until July as it was 48% lower than in 2019.



**This quick overview of the employment market structuration and situation brings out questions of social impact of the crisis and the social structuration of the metropolis.** In fact, the median living standard (22.310€/year in 2018) is an interesting indicator but, at that scale, it covers great inequalities with a decile ratio of 7,6 for Toulouse Métropole and 10,4 for the city of Toulouse. As an example, the IRIS of Auriacombe, in the district of Reynerie, presents the lowest median income with 5620€ whereas the IRIS with the highest median, also in the city of Toulouse, presents a median of 37720€. But these inequalities between some territories are not sufficient to carry a solid analysis. In fact, two elements are to be added in order to better understand the structure of the territory: the spatial segregation and the diversity that can be observed in each local (IRIS, district) territory. In an analysis bill published in June 2020 (n°92), France Strategie researchers show that spatial segregation is lower in 2015 than in 1990 but its structuration is still unequal. In general, executives and head of companies are more segregated than employees and workers. The direct correlation with income is not evident inside these categories but the study shows that middle incomes are little segregated whereas lowest, and mostly highest incomes are significantly more segregated.

**Graphique 2 – Indices de ségrégation par groupes de niveau de vie et par catégories d'unités urbaines en 2017**



Note : En 2017, l'indice de ségrégation des 5 % les plus aisés dans l'unité urbaine de Paris est de 50 %. *Nota bene* : les groupes de niveau de vie sont définis unité urbaine par unité urbaine et non à l'échelle nationale.


Champ : individus âgés de 25 à 54 ans.

Source : calculs France Stratégie à partir de Fidéli (2017)

At a local level, this analysis can also be applied. On the maps below, we can see that most of the territories do not concentrate poverty or wealth (first and tenth decile of the income in the urban area considered). However, few territories seem to actually concentrate low- or high-income populations: Grand Mirail and Empalot for the lowest income, the very centre of Toulouse and some specific districts for the highest income.

These elements help understanding demographic and social structuration of the territory. They are factual indicators necessary to better understand Toulouse Metropole as a heterogeneous metropolis. However, in order to complete that description, it seems necessary to add some comments on resources and public policies.

First, echoing our last considerations, it is necessary to highlight that the Article 55 of SRU (solidarity and urban renewing) law of 2000 and its continuity (law Duflot I in 2013) require that large municipalities (more than 1,500 inhabitants in Île-de-France, and more than 3,500 inhabitants for other regions), which are included in a conurbation of more than 50,000 inhabitants comprising at least one municipality of more than 15,000 inhabitants, have at least 20% of social housing. The map hereafter shows the state of Toulouse Metropole municipalities regarding this rule in 2018. We can see that most municipalities with low-income rates do comply with this rule, whereas peripheral municipalities have much less social housing rates.




## Taux de logements sociaux (communes $\geq 3\,500$ hab.)

### Rappel Règlementaire :

Les dispositions de l'article 55 de la loi SRU (renforcées par celles de l'art.10 de la Loi Duflot de 2013) portent obligation aux communes de  $\geq 3\,500$  habitants (hors région parisienne) incluses dans une agglomération de  $\geq 50\,000$  hab. de compter **25%** de logements sociaux dans leur parc de résidences principales.

### Inventaire SRU au 1/1/2018



Regarding education, each municipality established a sectorisation of "school pools" that ensures a proximity between elementary public schools and inhabitants of the area. Public secondary schools, in the same way, are sectorised by the Conseil Départemental. However, less colleges exist and some municipalities correspond to colleges in another municipality. For instance, inhabitants of Beauzelle choosing public education have to send their children to Blagnac. Another exception exists, resulting from a political decision of the Conseil Département in order to foster social diversity the paragraphs above are quotation from Conseil Départemental's website:

Today, there are secondary schools in relegated areas that suffer from urban segregation and in which pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds are concentrated, while pupils from advantaged backgrounds are concentrated in secondary schools located in advantaged areas.

These differences in the social composition of schools are also accompanied by differences in terms of academic performance: Toulouse has both the schools with the best academic results and those with the worst results in the department. Therefore, the 'classic' sectorisation as it exists today, being based on the local area, cannot alone correct the effects of the urban segregation that it is experiencing.

Five schools are impacted, two will be closed and re-built in a more "diverse" area:

With 80% of its pupils being disadvantaged, the Raymond Badiou secondary school will gradually close its doors. It will be rebuilt on Boulevard Eisenhower, in the Saint-Simon district, a more mixed geographical catchment area. This secondary school, with a maximum capacity of

600 pupils, will be delivered for the start of the 2021 school year and represents a budget of 24 million euros for the community.

Bellefontaine secondary school, which also has nearly 80% disadvantaged pupils, was also included in the social diversity programme. At the start of the 2019 school year, sixth grade pupils started school in six more advantaged colleges in the Toulouse conurbation. More than 140 pupils from the Bellefontaine district are concerned.

These pupils will also benefit from all the support measures deployed by the Department and the French Ministry of Education for pupils in the Reynerie district, such as the introduction of dedicated shuttles and mediation mechanisms.

A new secondary school located in the Guilhermy district will open its doors at the start of the 2022 school year to accommodate pupils from the Bellefontaine sector and respond to the demographic pressure in south-west Toulouse.

The other three schools are being reformed in order to make them more attractive:

Three Toulouse secondary schools, classified as Réseau d'éducation prioritaire renforcée, are located in relatively mixed areas, but are subject to a phenomenon of 'avoidance' of the school map due to a degraded image.

The in-situ rehabilitation of the Rosa Parks secondary school in the Lalande district, with a gradual reconstruction of all the educational facilities at a cost of approximately 10 million euros, will substantially improve the conditions of reception.

The relocation of the entrance to the Stendhal secondary school in the Mirail district, which was previously located at the end of a dead end that was not very accessible, not very visible and therefore not very attractive, has made it possible to open up this establishment to a more welcoming public space.

The George Sand secondary school, located in the Cépière district and accommodating the children of Bagatelle, is also under consideration.

This policy implies population flows and a specific organisation for the families, and also for the department, with special school shuttles, support programs etc.

This first set of elements help to understand Toulouse Metropolis as a **complex territory which is far from “neutral”**: each district and local area is both a specific territory and a part of a greater entity to which it is articulated and compose environments of experience. In that sense, public transport lines, access to rights or services in the local territory or out of it, connexions with other districts through school or specific needs are to be taken into account. It is only with these dynamic environments that we will be able to grasp which articulations and which indicators can be

considered as vulnerability or protective factors for radicalisation. **In fact, more than independent factors, we will be trying to observe these environments as they can efficiently lead to forms of political participation that do not include radical violence and foster citizenship and democracy at large.**

Building bridges between environments and radical violence, however, is not an easy task. Some authors may directly link wealth (Varaine, 2021) or inequalities (DARE, 2021) and extremism or radicalisation, but we should keep cautious about too simplistic explanations. In the process of building our indicators, we should be attentive both to global literature and to local history, which is far from neutral. This report should contain a local history linked to radicalisation; however, incoming publications could help us to grasp that history in more detail and lead us to postpone the presentation of such history. In next report, we shall then link the large scape we draw here with more precise historical data, crossing information in order to precise our comprehension of radicalism phenomenon. Secondly, it was necessary to better define the geographical limits of the analysis.

# Conclusion

The analysis reports aim at providing a better understanding of radicalisation phenomenon and its prevention on Toulouse Métropole territory. This first deliverable is fundamental as it brings the basis for a general analysis. First, we had to define the terms, shaping the object to be studied. It was not an easy task as radicalisation, extremism and citizenship can be though on very different ways and all the partners brought different backgrounds. However, this diversity ended reinforcing the coherence of the project as it allowed us to start from a wide idea, narrowing it progressively through the concepts we presented on the first part of this report. As a result of our discussions, we chose to focus on indicators of polarisation at a local level as these indicators are considered to show the environmental conditions of the rise of radicalisation and extremism and its violent outputs.

Secondly, a more precise spatial framework had to be built. Toulouse Metropole is at the same time too big for a qualitative approach that would present the sufficient details and too little to have access to significant quantitative data about the most relevant polarisation indicators. Hence, a set of districts and municipalities were proposed to serve as a basis for the study. Along the project, some of these territories will be abandoned due to a lack of access or relevance. However, D3.6.-1. provides an overview of these territories for themselves and compared. This first work led us to abandon a too restrictive classification and to keep attentive to the singularity of every area. The links, both on an epistemological level and at a grass-root level will then be integrated during the next reports. This agility should also facilitate the apprehension of the Metropolis as a whole. In fact, the second step of the study will consist in an aggregation of the local data in order to understand metropolitan dynamics. This larger scale will help us connecting empirical based issues with public policies and recommendations.

Public policies actually have been presented here at a national and local level. This articulation was necessary to complete the picture of Toulouse Metropole's environment. The doctrine developed since 2014 in France has evolved a lot, from counter-terrorism to radicalisation, and then to separatism and "republican principles". These evolutions marked the political and public landscape and had actual effects on the environment studied. Unfortunately, few studies present the impact of these policies and their dynamics, and these studies are often presenting only the main drawbacks in terms of stigmatisation and polarisation (Ragazzi *et al.*, 2018 ; De Feo, 2021). Next reports will explore this at a local level. Once described the main national measures and features, we tried to understand their local declinations as well as fully local initiatives. It appeared that a lot of projects and programs exist impacting Toulouse Métropole. These are both organised by the state, the Conseil Départemental, National Education and other specialised institutions. These initiatives were presented separately and are actually very little linked or articulated. In fact, we will show in next reports that most actors do not identify clearly the resources and actors in charge of preventing radicalisation, which reinforces our will to propose a synthesis and coordination institution.

Finally, a first insight was given about the socio-economical structure of Toulouse Métropole. Although apparently little linked to our focus, this presentation should help us to better apprehend the environment we aim at understanding. In next report, a historical approach on radicalisation as it occurred on the territory will be presented in addition to the general environment presentation of

this first report. Crossing both approaches will let us define an intermediate point which is the space where we will be able to talk about prevention.

Due to COVID-19 crisis, empirical work of producing data was mostly suspended, but discussions with many institutional stakeholders allowed us to prepare the field in order to facilitate later intervention. It also forced us to focus on available data before meeting local actors and frontline practitioner, which will for sure help providing advices and a global vision of the territory. Next reports will provide more concrete data on prevention practices at a first-line scale and thus participate to the local effort for grasping and preventing radical violence.

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## Extremism, Radicalisation, Citizenship

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## General Introduction

Six months after the publication of the first analysis and local analysis report, the analysis activities keep going. Most data available still consist in statistical data while local partners are being involved in the preparation of the focus groups per territory. On this basis, the reflection about the structuration of our approach is evolving and being precised. The first part of this analysis report shows this evolution through the consolidation of indicators that should be used for further presentations. These indicators, though, should not be thought in an evaluation perspective. Their aim is not about how « radicalised » a territory is or appears to us but they furnish and articulate specific insights that we consider relevant to be further explored and interpreted. This is one of the reasons why we decided to change the typology of the territories : these territories are not to be thought as more or less « radicalised » and all of them are « watch areas » in fact. At the same time, objective data do make relevant to discriminate « priority areas » because they do present some specificities (mainly low income) and are the object of a specific public policy that highly impact the territory. The guidelines that emerged from this work, thus, will be used as general orientations with local partners during the focus groups in order to produce a full, objective and inter-subjective view of each territory, crossing views and data sets.

At the same time, some secondary discussions that took place between the project partners appeared worth noting here. The sharing of our national contexts in terms of radicalisation and its prevention was a very stimulating time. It helped us better understand each other's environment and assertions and it seemed important to us to report these discussions here as it is an important part of our reflection process about what should be called radicalisation, radicality, extremism, citizenship, social cohesion and how to deal with these notions.

Finally, we will present a little bit more of the prevention network as it exists in Toulouse Métropole in order to better identify what are the existing actors and the resources on which we could capitalise in the next months.

# Object and Methodology

## Guidelines for the workgroups and interviews

### Theoretical frame and the guideline

Deliverable 3.3-1 provides a chapter about the relation between extremism, violent radicalisation and social cohesion. Since social cohesion is a relatively vague concept, the chapter also presents a theoretical framework, that focuses on some theories that are better-funded (see deliverable 3.3-1):

- Theories on subjective well-being,
- Theories on democracy and participation
- Theories on identity (five pillars of identity)
- Theories on social capital and spatial issues

We decided to structure our indicators along six main categories, that correlate to the concept of social cohesion and to the theoretical approaches applied so far and that correspond to existing research about social cohesion like « Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion » (Jenson 2010), published by the UNRISD. These main-categories are:


1. Socio-demographic factors
2. Education
3. Housing & neighbourhood
4. Spatial factors
5. Perception (perspectives, identification)
6. Political factors (political values)

Each category includes sub-categories (factors), that consist of two types of data:

1. Statistical data, collected by a secondary analysis of existing data (mostly INSEE and Municipalité de Toulouse) and
2. qualitative data, that will be grasped in form of group interviews / discussions, conducted in the course of the project.

Statistical data allows to describe the main-category “socio-demographic factors”. Other main-categories, like “perception” have to be reconstructed by means of qualitative data, be it because of the lack of existing statistical data, be it because it is not possible to come to a deeper understanding of the social situation, the perceptions and the lifeworlds of the people concerned by means of

quantitative data. Some of the main-categories, like e.g. “political factors” include both types of data (see figure 1).



*figure 1: Main-categories and type of data*

The collection of statistical data in the project is mostly done (see deliverable 3.6-2). Qualitative data still will be collected and the guideline for these “workgroups in the territories” will be presented in the following chapter.

The goal of this second type of data collection is to come to a deeper understanding of the specific situation in the territories. As carried out in deliverable 3.6-2, we suppose that there exist very different qualities of social cohesion in the various territories, depending on the specific social structure of each territory, but also on the perception of the inhabitants and stakeholders, that may vary in terms of their social position, their economic and/or cultural capital.

So, the final outcome of the group discussions is to find out more about social experiences and perceptions in relation to the specific social and structural circumstances.

## Preliminary remarks

The guideline questions are structured according to the theories mentioned above. In the same time, they refer to the main-categories, that help describing concrete situations in the territories.

Different stakeholders form the working groups in the territories. Therefore, it is not possible to express the questions in a way that fits to every type of addressee: parts of the questions have to be adapted according to the type of interviewee or group and the questions don't have to be asked literally. We talk here about “the guideline”. Actually, there are different guidelines, depending on the participants of the workgroups.

Finally, it is not important to keep the order of the guideline questions during the interview. It is the discussion is that counts. Even, not every question has to be asked, if the participants start talking about the concerning issue in the course of the discussion (about interview practice see Kaufmann 2015).

## Guideline(s)

### Theoretical approach: subjective well-being

- How satisfied are you with your life chances ?
- What is your profession / level of income / type of housing / associative/political commitment ?
- All things considered, how satisfied are you / are the inhabitants of the territory with your/their life as a whole ?
- How would you define your professional situation / living conditions / income level / relationship to politics? OR How would you define the various levels with regard to inhabitants of the territory (of different social groups living in the territory) ?
- How satisfied are you / people living in the territory with your / their financial situation/your income ?
- How satisfied are you / people living in the territory with your / their living standard ?

#### Reference: main-category

Questions refer to  
Perception  
(Perspectives & identification)

### THEORETICAL APPROACH: FIVE PILLARS OF IDENTITY

- Do you have a positive vision of your personal future ?
- In 5/10 years, what could your professional and/or educational and/or housing situation be like ?
- What would you say about the evolution of French society/the district/the city and what do you think it is heading towards ?
- Do you consider that you have been discriminated against and for what reasons? OR Are there any social groups, living in the territory, which suffer from discrimination ? Which groups ? How ?
- Do you consider that your opinions are or can be held by yourself or by others in the district/town/in France ?

Refer to  
Perception  
(Perspectives & identification)

Refer to  
Perception  
(Perspectives & identification)

## Theoretical approach: democracy and participation

- (Tell me about trust in ... / What are your experiences with ... / Let us talk about trust...) Refer to  
How much do you as a representative of your institution and/or Political factors  
How much do inhabitants of the territory trust in the following  
institutions : \* state; \* city, local \* police; \* political system; \*  
political parties \* parliament, \* etc.
- Please describe the mutual trust within the stakeholders' groups Security / political  
(e.g. police vs. social workers, members of associations) factors  
Also: development of the relationships
- Are you in regular exchange with each other? Security / political  
factors
- Can you give an estimation about the trust in official Refer to  
institutions? How much do you believe, inhabitants of your Political Factors  
territory do trust in different institutions?
- Do you consider that you live "in a democracy"?
- How do you assess the opportunities for political participation  
in your district or city?
- How do you assess the opportunities for participation in  
community life in your district or city?
- Rank these different political principles in order of importance  
(from most to least important): freedom of expression, freedom  
of religion, secularism, authority, order, etc.
- What – in your opinion – is the best way to govern a  
country/city/region etc.: \* representative democracy; \* direct  
democracy; \* expert rule; \* a strong leader who doesn't need to  
care about parliaments; \* other

## Theoretical approach: social capital and spatial issues

- Are there schools and kindergardens in the district ? How many ? Refer to Spatial factors
- Are the inhabitants of the district satisfied with the quality of these institutions ? If not : What are the reasons ? What could be improved ?
- Is there any youth work (youth center, outreaching youth work, private associations, churches, clubs) in the district ?
- Does it foster exchange between different groups of youths ?
- What about public transport ? Can people reach other districts easily ?
- Can they reach shopping opportunities easily ?
- Are there any institutions, associations or clubs in your district ?
- Would more of those institutions, associations or clubs be necessary ? Which ones ? Why ?
- Where do inhabitants turn to in case of unemployment? Where do they try to find support?
- How do you see the relationships between the inhabitants in the district ? Are there many conflicts ? What kind of conflicts ? Refer to Security
- How do you realize, that there are conflicts ? How do they manifest ? Where ?
- Do the inhabitants have any institutionalized opportunity to conduct conflicts (e.g. citizens' forum, public debates/local politics, ...) Refer to Political Factors

## Next steps

During the next weeks, TM will conduct several interviews in the workgroups of the territories.


The content of the interviews will be structured in form of a summarising analysis (Mayring 2010, p. 65). The relevant parts (phrases that correspond to the main-factors) are going to be transcribed and translated into the English. The material will be analysed by TM and FHS in a deductive way, supplemented by inductive findings. The factors that are based on this qualitative material have to be defined, in order to complete the set of factors of each main-category.

Finally, the factors will be evaluated in order to come to detailed pictures of specific forms of social cohesion in the different territories.

## Territories : New typology

On the basis of the first analysis (D3.3.-1, D3.6.-1 and D3.6.-2), the categories of territories that had been proposed on the preliminary steps of the project showed some important limitations. Apart from priority areas, which correspond to a clear income criteria and is the object of a specific public policy, « watch areas » and « neutral areas » did not correspond to objective realities. In fact, it should be possible to make a relevant typology from further analysis. The dynamics of population and polarisation, the types of use of the public space, the presence of specific problematics should be used to build this typology. However, at this point, we do not have sufficient data to do so in a relevant way. Thus, we decided to keep priority areas as a specific categories and to separate the rest of the territories in function of the kind of methodology that will be applied (see D3.6.-2).

The map below shows these categories : in pink are the priority areas, in orange the area with the full methodology to be developed, in blue the ones with lighter methodology in development.



# Public Policies Analysis: a European perspective

Since the beginning of the project, we have been confronting and discussing radicalisation prevention from different perspectives. First, our attention was drawn by the differences and possible translations of the terms of the project. Each national political culture appeared as a specific perspective that we had to integrate to the project and adapt to the local context. Secondly, a genuine European perspective based on the dense interactions of the European Commission and the RAN may be considered as a resource in such a context. The following part is a summary of the reflection we held in order to better understand the differences and common perspectives in order to be able to acknowledge our specific vocabularies and to stabilise the definitions that are assumed by the project.

Most of the French development in preventing radicalisation was presented in D3.3.-1. Nonetheless, the term « Separatism » was only recently used in the realm of prevention. This work will thus be completed in D3.3.-3. as a new law should be passed in late August 2021.

## Preventing Radicalisation in Greece

Greece is in its initial steps of designing a policy to prevent Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, as until today an actual Greek prevention plan has not yet been implemented. However, as it has been announced by the Greek Prime Minister, a national strategy to fight terrorism and violent extremism is going to be presented within next months. The scope of this new strategy is to ensure the effective prevention of radicalization towards terrorism and violent extremism so as to maintain a high level of security in both Greece and European Union.

To begin with, in Greek Law there is no legislation exclusively concerned with radicalisation, although different measures have been developed to tackle terrorism and hate crimes. Radicalisation has always been present in Greek political movement, it is not until 2016 that it becomes part of the formal agenda though. Hence, Greek legislation provides a definition of terrorism, organized and hate crime. More specifically, Law 3251/2004 entitled “European Arrest Warrant and Confrontation of Terrorism” introduced the definition of terrorism to the Greek Penal Code under Article 187A. According to this definition, terrorist actions:

[...] are committed in such a way, to such an extent or under such conditions, that is possible to seriously harm a country or an international organisation, along with the purpose of seriously intimidating a population or illegally forcing a public authority or an international organisation to perform or to abstain from performing an action or with the purpose of seriously harming or destroying the fundamental constitutional, political and economic structures of a country or of an international organization.

In 2016, the Greek State Security Directorate and the Greek Center for Security Studies defined the **term of Radicalisation** as the process in which a person accepts the use of force to achieve political, ideological or religious objectives. However, it is worth noting that radicalisation does not necessarily lead to violent extremism or terrorism, and radical behavior is not necessarily problematic.

Regarding the existing **legal framework**, it provides provisions for the punishment of terrorism, organised crime, hate crime, hooliganism and violent and non-violent extremism. However, Greek legislation does not include any provisions specifically referring to radicalisation and its related trends (Left/Right-wing, Islamism, hooliganism). Domestic legislation is also shaped by the transposition both of all relevant EU laws and the international legal instruments pertaining to issues of terrorism and organised crime. In that context, domestic anti-terrorist legislation is accompanied by relevant international laws that have been ratified by statute, and which according to the Greek constitution, prevail under any contrary provisions of national law.

**Laws 2928/2001, 3251/2004, 3691/2008, 3875/2010 and 4689/2020 and Articles 187 and 187A of the Greek Penal Code regulate the issue of terrorism and organised crime in Greece.**

There are four **fundamental papers** that frame programs, actions and responses at the operational level:

- The EU Strategy on Counterterrorism (EU level)
- The Strategic Orientations from the Steering Board on Preventing Radicalisation (EU level)
- The 2020 – 2024 National Crime Policy (national level)
- The National Strategy on Counterterrorism and Violent Extremism (national level)

#### ***Prevention activities at national level***

- During the Greek Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2014, Greece played a leading role in promoting EU policy in the area of combating terrorism, and specifically on these issues: deterring radicalization and the recruitment of terrorists, combating the financing of terrorism, linking security and development, and flows of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq.
- Since 1991, Greece has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental organization that promotes policies through 40 recommendations aimed at, among other things, preventing the financing of terrorism.

In the context of the efforts to eradicate sources of funding for terrorism, Greece has raised at the competent EU working group the issue of confronting illegal trafficking in, and sale of, ancient artefacts from the region of Iraq and Syria as a source of funding.

Deployment of guest officers at migration hotspots: Europol provides support to Greece by deploying short-term seconded national experts (“guest officers”) at hotspots on the eastern Aegean islands.

#### ***Prevention initiatives at national level***

- Greece recognizes the role of family and school, the internet and social media, and the need for counter radicalization in prisons (Counter-Radicalisation pocket guides for the public and front-line practitioners, 2016).
- International Network for the Study of Extremism and Terrorism: It is about a newly created institute for the study of radicalization, extremism and terrorism within the Ministry of Citizen Protection.

- **Observatory for the prevention of Bullying and Violence in Schools:** The Observatory is created by the Greek Ministry of Education & Religious Affairs to prevent and deal with school violence and aims to design and implement actions for the prevention of school violence and bullying.
- **National Observatory against racism and xenophobia:** It is about recording incidents of racism and xenophobia to strengthen human rights.
- **The “Declaration of Athens”:** It is an initiative between KEMEA and the Central Municipalities Association of Greece (KEDE) aiming to prevent and tackle radicalization and violent extremism within the cities, and realized under the EU project PRACTICIES.
- **Racist Violence Recording Network:** It is about reporting for cyberbullying, hate speech and hate crime in Greece, with ultimate aim to tackle social polarization and deliver alternative narratives against discrimination and racism.
- In the context of **raising awareness**, a new initiative that offers alternative narratives regarding the notion of victimhood of terrorism, aiming to make the community resilient and create empathy to the general public and the youth, took place in January 2021: the inauguration of **“Office for Support of Terror Victims”** under the Ministry of Citizen Protection.

### ***Institutional Agencies engaged in the process of PVE/CVE***

- The **State Security Division** is a subordinate of the Security Branch of the Hellenic Police, responsible for the strategic coordination on issues relating to terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization.
- The **Special Violent Crime (Counter Terrorism) Division [CT Unit]** falls directly under the Chief of the Hellenic Police and works to confront crimes of extreme violence with the purpose of prevention and repression of all terrorist acts. It includes, among others, the Department for Combating Internal Terrorism; the Department for Combating International Terrorism; and the Department for Combating Other Violent Crimes.
- The **Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (EKAM)** constitutes the elite Special Unit of the Hellenic Police, with the mission to effectively respond to serious and exceptionally dangerous situations (such as terrorist actions, etc.)
- The **Information Analysis and Management Division (HPiD)** is the Central Intelligence Hub of the Hellenic HP, focusing on combating all forms of crime, but mainly serious and organised crime and terrorism.
- The **Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorist Financing and Source of Funds Investigation Authority**, which is the national unit active in combating the financing of terrorism.
- The **Violence Prevention Unit** (July 2020) within the Ministry of Citizen Protection has a coordinating and lead role in preventing violence, in all its forms, at the national level.

### ***Prevention Policies by Hellenic Police***

The Hellenic Police has developed an Anti-Corruption Policy Program, 2020 - 2024, which constitutes central point of reference for all police services. Through this Program, it is attempted to rationalize prevention and repression of crime, with the ultimate goal of ensuring citizens' safety, without sacrificing safety rights. The Hellenic Police has also taken the initiative to prepare the plan on national strategy for countering terrorism, which will also include issues of violent extremism and radicalization.

Today, there is a non-typical inter-ministerial network of Police, ministries and other agencies (ministry of Education, ministry of Justice, ministry of Digital Policy, general secretariat of integration, general secretariat of Roma etc.) that ensures the exchange of information in a non-typical or constituted way. This effort has been empowered by the Hellenic Police after the sharing of the Manual for the Signs of Radicalisation to the ministries or agencies in charge.

Last but not least, the Hellenic Police is actively participating in all programs and actions planned within the EU initiatives, bringing together expertise at national authorities (education, labour, prisons, criminal justice system, internet activities, migration and refugees, and reintegration).

### ***Participation of Greece in Global & European Networks***

Greece is participating in both international and regional fora and trainings geared to bolster criminal justice efforts to prevent and respond to terrorism. These are as follows:

- High Level Commission's Expert Group Radicalization (HLCEG-R)
- Steering Board Prevent Policymakers Secretariat
- Radicalization Awareness Network (Police and Local) – RAN Pol & RAN Local
- Greece is a member of various international bodies and of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
- Greece cooperates in regional information sharing with the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime, and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

### ***A summary of all the instruments used to reduce or prevent radicalisation would be as follows:***

- Increase of criminal regulations related to the dissemination of contents that promote radicalisation, the funding of radical or terrorist groups, etc;
- Increase of security measures, with greater provision of resources for the security forces;
- Creation of programmes for the prevention of radicalisation;
- Creation of refugee reception centres;
- Development of different training measures on the area of violent radicalisation;
- Gathering information on radicalisation;
- Monitoring radicalisation.

### ***Priority Axes***

The upcoming National Strategy to fight Terrorism & Violent Extremism is built upon the following five Priority Axes and applies to all three levels of prevention (primary – secondary – tertiary).

- Prison and probation, rehabilitation and reintegration (EXIT programs).
- Exchange of best practices and ideas/multiagency cooperation.
- Identifying and addressing risk of radicalization of individuals belonging to groups requiring particular attention.
- Communication and countering online propaganda.
- Education and social inclusion.

# Preventing radicalisation in Austria

## Background

For a long time, Austria was one of the few countries without any strategy against violent radicalisation and extremism. Therefore, in 2017 the Ministry of the Interior founded the Nationwide Network for Preventing Extremism and Deradicalisation (“Bundesweites Netzwerk Extremismusprävention und Deradikalisierung, BNED”). The Network includes several national ministries, the provinces (Bundesländer), representations of cities and communities and several social organizations and associations.

“The network's mission is,

- to bundle individual measures for the prevention of extremism and deradicalisation,
- promote professional and interdisciplinary exchange on nationwide measures in the field of extremism prevention and deradicalisation,
- identify appropriate intervention measures (such as an exit programme from violent extremism),
- and to develop recommendations for action, strategies, action plans, etc. on current topics of extremism prevention and deradicalisation.”

(Bundeskanzleramt 2020, [www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at](http://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at))

One of the first tasks of the network was to draw up the “National Strategy for Prevention of Extremism and Deradicalization”, published in 2018. Since very different actors and stakeholders developed the paper, it follows a holistic approach that takes into consideration all parts of society as well as different repressive and preventive approaches.

On the international level several documents and strategies served as role models for the Austrian strategy. Namely, the European Union policy directive “Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Terrorism and Violent Extremism” from 2014, the “United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy” from 2015 and the policy paper “Development of a Local Prevention Frame and Guiding Principles” of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) from 2016.

The “Austrian Strategy for Preventing Extremism and Deradicalization” will be summarized in the following.

## Austrian Strategy for Preventing Extremism and Deradicalization

### *Holistic approach – combination of repression and prevention*

Extremism is a phenomenon that is not driven by a simple causality but it develops through a net of factors and various single phenomena that have complex effects one to each other. This is the reason for bundling different measures from different perspectives in order to fight extremism on different societal levels. In any case, extremism is a “challenge that cannot be met with repressive measures alone.” (p. 14) One of the main principles is to build up networks on the different societal levels, where public and civil actors may exchange and cooperate.

### ***Extremism in all forms***

All forms of extremism have in common that they reject democracy and democratic constitution. The strategy therefore concentrates not only on one form of extremism but on every ideology that is a threat for the democratic system. Thus, it follows a “broad understanding of extremism” (p. 15).

A general understanding of the strategy refers to future developments of extremism and radicalisation. The authors assume that antidemocratic ideologies will attract people further on. Besides concrete radicalized groups there will be a rising number of single actors, so the Strategy.

Although, extremism is a practice of minorities, it may reach a broader public and radicalize greater parts of society. In order to avoid this, trust in society is one of the major goals of measures against extremism. Trust may result from participation in democratic processes and from social cohesion.

Another crucial principle is that measures and rules against extremism must not be antidemocratic themselves. That means that there has to be a certain balance between freedom of expression and prohibition of the articulation of extremist contents. Guiding principles are fundamental democratic principles like liberalism, rule of law, democracy, federalism and republic and separation of powers. But also, basic values like respect, tolerance, gender equality or participation are conditions of a well-working democratic society.

### ***Human rights as basis***

In general, human rights and dignity – as normative base of democracy – are main principles, background and goal of extremism prevention. Anyway, rights of groups are subordinated to individual rights and dignity of the individual. Special importance is given to children’s rights, their protection and the fostering of their opportunities to participate.

### ***Identity, diversity, belonging***

Diversity is a further principle of the Austrian strategy. Recognition of diverse groups but also questions of equal treatment and equal access to resources belong to this characteristic of the strategy. Inclusion and participation both need to be fostered, in terms of the belonging to different ethnic groups, to gender aspects or to other categories of discrimination, like age or disability.

### ***Balance between security and freedom***

Wherever it comes to rise security of the population, the restriction of individual rights is an issue. Law enforcement agencies are obliged to guarantee security what means that the right of freedom may be restricted. Such a restriction always has to be well-balanced. What counts is the principle of proportionality, and again: especially when it comes to the protection of the rights of children and young people.

### ***Ideologies of inequality (violence in all its forms)***

As mentioned above, all forms of extremism shall be considered by the National Strategy. On the other hand, it’s not only violent groups that the strategy focuses on, but also groups or persons that foster racist or sexist attitudes. The strategy calls these attitudes “ideologies of inequality” (p. 18). Discrimination of minorities plays an important role, when it comes to define such groups

Although both approaches – consideration of violent groups vs. radicalized attitudes – are part of the strategy, the paper makes clear, that there is a line between free speech and the violation of

democratic rules and that there has to be made very exact consideration whether a case tends to extremism or whether it is still a case of expression of one's attitude: "The pure individual conviction of a radical idea in a democratic constitutional state is not per se illegal. The borderline to extremism is often violence, used in order to assert individual conviction." (p. 21)

So, while radicalisation, according to the Austrian strategy, starts with one's political, religious or other ideological attitudes, political extremism is related to violent behaviour. Violence here, is considered a legitimate means to reach extremist goals. Terrorism as a next step of escalation tends to violence the order of society. It intends to harm a state or an international organization and is always defined as a criminal act. It is "committed with the objective

I. to intimidate the population in a grave way

II. to force a government or an international organization to act or to refrain acts or

III. to destabilize or to destroy the political, constitutional, economic or social orders of a state or an international organization." (p. 21)

## Characteristics, objectives and measures

The main characteristics of the national strategy can be summarized by the following topics:

- Security, law enforcement, resocialisation
- Political and democracy culture
- Cooperation and resources
- Education, labour market, resilience
- Social responsibility and health
- Science and research
- Internet and the media
- Gender

According to the strategy, extremism prevention and deradicalization correlate with the fostering of security, namely social security. So, social security is one of the main goals of the strategy: „Social security, social justice and the protection of human needs are conditions for the social peace of a society and thus are essential resilience factors against the emergence of radicalization and extremism“ (p. 23). A second goal, that is connected with the first one, is inclusion: "Social security can only be realized, if inclusion is a goal of our society [...]." (p. 26) In this sense, primary prevention is a first step in order to avoid the upcoming of extremist attitudes and activities.

Besides this preventive background, driven by social or private associations, law enforcement agencies play a key role. They take over the repressive side of the activities. Their task is to prosecute offenders, but also to prevent delinquencies. They protect the population against radicalisation and extremism and react to criminal extremist acts. Another important part of the whole puzzle are methods that allow the exit out of extremist milieus.

Strengthening of democratic consciousness is a crucial condition of a well-working democracy. Measures that foster democratic culture support participation and the sense of belonging to an open and democratic community.

On national and on international level networks and cooperation are necessary to prevent the rise of extremist ideologies. On national level, the state, federal provinces and communities have to work together and share responsibility. They are encouraged to build up networks and concrete objectives and activities in order to prevent radicalisation processes. Also, a centralized national coordination point is a suggestion of the strategy. Target of such a unit could be to initialize measures and trainings that help a broad civil society to increase awareness of radicalisation and extremism and to support extremists, willing to exit.

Formal and non-formal education are crucial when it comes to resilience against extremism. Educational measures have also an indirect effect because they foster inclusion by supporting people in their vocational and professional careers. Access to the labour market, especially for minority or vulnerable groups that suffer from exclusion is very important in terms of avoiding stigmatization and supporting personal development and perspectives for people concerned.

Discrimination and exclusion are an issue within many societal sectors, such like social security system, child and youth welfare, school social work, youth work or public health. Discrimination because of gender and sex, sexual orientation, origin or religion have to be considered as background of radicalisation processes and have to be tackled by preventive activities. Minorities have to be protected against exclusion and intersectional forms of discrimination.

Science and research are important sources, so practitioners and researchers should cooperate and share their experiences and their knowledge systematically. Reasons of extremist tendencies have to be analysed in order to come to an evidence about the complexity of the topic.

Besides primary prevention, secondary and tertiary prevention that address radicalized youths and extremist delinquents, should be the goals of scientific surveys.

The results of research should be collected and promoted by a data base, open to the public. Another suggestion concerns the creation of an independent competence centre, that coordinates research activities and the distribution of administrative resources.

One of the very important places where extremist ideologies grow and spread is the internet. But media can also be used in order to deradicalize and to prevent extremism. A measure in this field is media competency. Digital social media create international spaces where extremist groups cooperate without any national frontiers. Therefore, activities against radicalisation should work together in international alliances, be it on administrative and executive level or on the level of associations, research and civil society.

Gender equality seems to be a topic that is often not well reflected in the context of deradicalization measures. Societies with a high level of gender equality are more resilient in terms of extremism. That is why it should be included to all measures as a cross cutting category.

The strategy finally concludes that Austria follows an innovative approach, characterized by a broad understanding of deradicalization and extremism prevention, an understanding that combines various ideas of repression and various forms of prevention.

More recent documents

Besides the 2018 National Strategy there are other reports and documents, that frame the activities against extremism on a national level. The Annual Reports of the Interior Security Agency provide statistical data about various forms of extremism and interpret them in order to give advice to responsible politicians. Mainly after an Islamist inspired attack of a single shooter in Vienna and the discovery of weapons in the circle of right-wing extremists by the end of 2020, new frameworks were introduced: the so-called “Anti-Terror-Package” and the renewal of the “Report of Right-Wing Extremism”. The three publications will be presented in the following.

### *Annual Reports of the Interior Security Agency (Jährlicher Verfassungsschutzbericht)*

The 2020 Report of the Interior Security Agency counts Islamism to the most threatening form of extremism in Austria: “For the reporting year 2019, Islamist extremism again posed a persistent and heightened threat to Austria, as well as to other European and non-European states.” (Annual Report, 2020, p. 12) As reasons for jihadist radicalization the Report suggests various motives: “Life and meaning crises, perceived or actual experiences of exclusion and discrimination, deviant lifestyles or open Salafist missionary work.” (Annual Report, 2020, p. 13)

Just like the National Strategy, the Security Agency promotes a broader approach, that combines repression and prevention: “In addition to increased repressive measures to avert danger, a strong preventive and cooperative, a whole-of-society approach is being pursued” (p. 15)

Anyway, besides Islamism as a thread, political-ideologically motivated violent radicalization plays an important role in Austria too. There were 954 delinquent acts of right-wing extremists in 2019, while left wing extremism shows 218 cases (figures 1 and 2).




figure 2: Cases of left-wing delinquency, 2018 and 2019 compared (Annual reports of the Interior Security Agency, 2020)




Abbildung: Tathandlungen/  
Anzeigen – Vergleich  
2018/2019

figure 3: Cases of right-wing delinquency, 2018 and 2019 compared (Annual reports of the Interior Security Agency, 2020)

Right-wing extremism rose noticeably between 2011 and 2016, in the following years it decreased slowly (figure 3), but still is on a high level.




figure 4: Development of right-wing, xenophobic and anti-Semitic delinquent acts from 2004-2019 (sources: Yearly Annual reports of the Interior Security Agency, 2005-2020), own presentation.

### ***“Anti-Terror-Package” (Anti-Terror-Paket)***

By the end of the year 2020 the situation in Austria changed drastically. On 2nd November 2020 there was an attack in the very center of Vienna. An Austrian single shooter, sympathizer of ISIS, shot four persons and injured 23 others. He was killed by the police.

Right wing extremism is also an issue in Austria, as shows a case from late 2020: In December the police found numerous pistols, grenades, automatic guns, more than 100.000 pieces of ammunition in Vienna. Several persons were arrested, who seem to have contacts to a network of German right-wing extremists.

Anyway, public attention and politics focus on Islamism. So, on 7th July 2021 the “National Council” (the Austrian parliament) introduced the so-called “Anti-Terror-Package” ([https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR\\_2021/PK0852/](https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2021/PK0852/)).

The terminology here changed from the fight against extremism to the fight against terrorism. As a first reaction to the assassination attempt, the financial resources of the Ministry of the Interior and the Justice were risen up to 125 Mio €. In the package so-called political Islam is regarded as the main driver of extremism in Austria. One of the main targets introduced in the package is to strengthen the “Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counter-Terrorism” (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung, BVT). The public reception criticizes that the resources do not consider the increase of funding of social or preventive measures (<https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000121444857/wo-deradikalisierung-in-oesterreich-ihre-luecken-hat>).

In the turn of the “anti-terror-package” the Austrian “Islam law” received an amendment (<https://religion.orf.at/stories/3204086/>). According to the renewed version, financial flows to mosques and Muslim communities are observed in a more restrictive way and influence from the exterior are controlled more efficiently. In case of infringement of the law, Muslim communities may be closed and forbidden more easily, without giving them the opportunity to react to accusations. Muslim representatives criticize that the measure excludes Muslims in general (<https://orf.at/stories/3220197/>).

The “anti-terror-package” itself includes electronical surveillance of ex-prisoners with an extremist background, a stricter Citizenship Act, that provides withdrawal of citizenship (when a person has two nationalities) in case of membership to or financial support of a terrorist association, and a so-called Symbol Act. The latter prohibits the use, wearing, spreading or showing of extremist symbols of certain associations, amongst them the right-wing extremist Identitarian Movement, the right-wing group “die Österreicher”, the Sunni-Islamist Hizb ut-Tahrir the Jihadist-Islamist group Kavkas-emirat, Hisbollah and others.

### ***Report of Right-Wing Extremism (Rechtsextremismusbericht)***

Until the year 2002 a yearly Report of Right-Wing Extremism was published by the Austrian Ministry of the Interior ([https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/A/A\\_02251/index.shtml](https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/A/A_02251/index.shtml), <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000129452122/tuerkis-gruen-fuehrt-rechtsextremismus-bericht-wieder-ein>). Then, the Austrian government – a coalition of the conservative ÖVP and the right-wing FPÖ during these years – removed the report. The content was presented in a single chapter of the Annual Report of the Interior Security Agency only. This chapter provides primarily

quantitative data about the phenomenon (see above), while the new report focuses more on qualitative aspects.

One of the reasons to reintroduce this specific report were the findings of weapons in right-wing extremist circles. Another reason is the expansion of right-wing attitudes that grew up together with conspiracy theories during the pandemic.

A first issue of the annual report will be published with beginning of 2022 summarizing findings and knowledge grasped in 2021.

# Preventing radicalisation in Spain: the Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta (PEN-LCRV)

## Characteristics of the Plan

The PEN-LCRV (National Strategic Plan to Counter Violent Radicalisation) assumes violent radicalisation as one of the main risks to national security and articulates the State's policy in this area through a comprehensive and national structure to prevent and avoid radicalisation processes culminating in violent extremism and/or terrorism.

This Plan understands that through comprehensive and coordinated action, it will be possible to deal effectively with any generator of violence, placing the necessary State resources at the service of this end, especially those linked to security, working together to raise awareness and sensitise Spanish society to the importance of the threat posed by violent extremism.

Only in this way will it be possible to maintain a plural society in which freedom of expression and thought are fully guaranteed and any violent ideology that seeks to undermine the stability and normal coexistence of citizens can be dealt with.

The objective of the Plan is focused on "constituting an effective instrument for the early detection and neutralisation of outbreaks and foci of violent radicalism, acting on those communities, collectives or individuals in a situation of risk or vulnerability".

## Structure of the Plan

The PEN-LCRV structures a comprehensive system of action that allows for the observation, assessment and treatment of those situations with a history of possible sources of violent radicalisation, which it does with a multidisciplinary approach. The Plan designs a structure with **three spheres of action, both internal, external and cyberspace**. These establish "WHERE" the State's actions must take place, interrelating them with three functional areas, defined by the "before" (**Prevent area**), the "during" (**Monitor area**) and the "after" (**Act area**) of any radicalisation process, and which indicate "HOW" and "WHEN" the previous actions must be carried out. Each area has an operational front of action, which determines "WHAT" action has to be carried out in each of them.

The characteristics of the PEN-LCRV define it as:

- **STRATEGIC** in its approach. It establishes a framework of minimums that must be observed and designs general lines of action that require subsequent development and specification in successive management plans which are planned on an annual basis.
- **NATIONAL** in its application and scope. With a vocation for generality and an integral nature, relying not only on the close collaboration and involvement of the administrations as a whole, but also with each and every one of their departments, throughout the territory of the State.

- EFFICIENT in its structure. It takes advantage of existing resources, means and instruments, especially those of the Administration as a whole, establishing a coordination system from a centralised perspective and exercised from the sphere of public security.

- COHERENT with the National Security Strategy (2013) in its formulation. It is eminently preventive in nature in the face of violent radicalisation, one of the main threats to national security. It is one more instrument within the actions for maintaining security, and identifies terrorism as "the greatest threat" that can be derived from a process of radicalisation.

## Application of the Plan

### ***Who is responsible for the implementation of the PEN-LCRV?***

The Plan includes "WHO" is responsible for executing the actions, distinguishing three blocks, the Administration, the groups at risk or vulnerable and civil society as a whole.

#### ***The Administration:***

This is the responsible actor that assumes the implementation of the Plan. The PEN-LCRV distinguishes the different levels in the Administration. A single centralised and inter-ministerial body, the highest national authority and multi-sectoral groups at local, provincial and/or autonomous community level.

Following the established criteria, the State will act through the different departments of the General State Administration (AGE), establishing an obligatory collaboration with the rest of the administrations. They will be coordinated by the state public security sphere.

#### ***Vulnerable groups at risk of threat of radicalisation:***

The collectives directly affected by the development of the Plan will be cooperating actors. Once the ideology underpinning the threat identified as a priority has been determined in the first Management Plan, the groups at risk or most vulnerable affected by it will be identified.

The incorporation of these groups into the structures created will be facilitated through qualified individuals and/or representatives of representative entities.

#### ***Civil society as a whole:***

The most representative social entities will take on the role of a cooperating actor. Their representatives will be appointed to collaborate in the development of this Plan, prioritising those sectors with the greatest incidence in relation to the problems of social integration and assistance. Sectors from the academic or university environment, as well as the media, will also be expressly included.

Only in this way will it be possible to maintain a plural society in which freedom of expression and thought are fully guaranteed and any violent ideology that seeks to undermine the stability and normal coexistence of citizens can be dealt with.

The objective of the Plan is focused on "constituting an effective instrument for the early detection and neutralisation of outbreaks and foci of violent radicalism, acting on those communities, collectives or individuals in a situation of risk or vulnerability".

## European Perspective

Presenting national strategies was necessary in order to better grasp our differences and common definitions. At the same time, working for a European project implies to question prevention strategies at a European scale. Within the European Union, awareness has been raised in successive steps about radicalisation. Some countries were affected in the middle of the 2000's (Spain in 2004, the United Kingdom in 2005, etc.) by Islamist terrorist attacks, others developed programs for countering extremism after right-wing crime rate grew more intensely in the 2010's (Germany, Austria, etc.), others began to tackle this issue after the departure of young Europeans to Syria for combatting with ISIS (France, Belgium, etc.). Although not involved with the same intensity and approaches, member States of the European Union actually began to work on radicalisation thematic since 2006. In April of this year, one of the first initiative of the Union was to implement the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation. This group was composed by twelve academic experts and sent a report in May 2008 to the European Commission, underlining the semantic instability of the terms “radicalisation” and “terrorism”, focusing on various types of violent political actions through history and insisting on the importance of socio-political environment for understanding the emergence of “radical” movements. At that time, it appeared that there were some points of dissonance between this group and other academic and non-academic experts mobilised by the Commission, mainly about three points: the very existence of the phenomenon of radicalisation as such, the relationship between so-called 'moderate' and 'radical' organisations, and the importance of collective action (Ragazzi 2014). Finally, the academic group was dissolved in 2008 and the main initiatives about radicalisation prevention continued to develop among non-academical experts, essentially from security agencies and think tanks, presenting a continuity with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands security agencies work published in 2004 and 2005.

In 2008, while receiving the first set of reports from different experts and agencies, twelve governments created a specific group composed mainly by agents from the ministries of home affairs, cooperating with the European Commission and the Counter-terrorism Coordinator (CTC) at the Council of the EU. This Policy Planner's Network on Countering Polarisation and Radicalisation (PPN) included representation from government agencies in the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, Finland, Norway and Victoria State (Australia). It worked until 2019 under the coordination of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) as a space for sharing good practices, research and experts reports. After the closure of the group in 2019, the ISD put in place a the Digital Policy Lab, aiming at replacing the PPN focusing especially on digital and online issues. In parallel to that government led initiative, the Radicalisation Awareness Network was launched in 2011 under the impulsion of the Commission.

The RAN is a network of frontline practitioners who work daily with both those vulnerable to radicalisation and those who have already been radicalised. As civil society representatives, social workers, youth workers, teachers, healthcare professionals, local authority representatives, police officers and prison officers, they are engaged in both preventing and countering violent extremism in all its forms and rehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremists.

Since it was founded in 2011, the RAN has attracted over 6,000 practitioners, who collectively represent all EU Member State. (European Commission Website)

The RAN is today a key actor at the European level as it gathers numerous officials and practitioners and centralises resources. It has the capacity to provide support and advice to its members and publishes reports on all its nine main issues, tackled by nine working groups:

- Communication and Narratives working group (RAN C&N)
- Youth and Education working group (RAN Y&E)
- Rehabilitation (RAN REHABILITATION)
- Local authorities working group (RAN LOCAL)
- Prisons Working Group (RAN PRISONS)
- Police and law enforcement working group (RAN POL)
- Victims of Terrorism working group (RAN VoT)
- Mental Health Working Group (RAN HEALTH)
- Families, communities and social care working group (RAN FC&S)
- Steering Committee

On the basis of these major initiatives the European Commission, through the DG HOME chose a definition of radicalisation as follows:

« Radicalisation is a phased and complex process in which an individual or a group embraces a radical ideology or belief that accepts, uses or condones violence, including acts of terrorism to reach a specific political or ideological purpose. »

This definition is a basis for the Commission's work although the realm of the support, including funding of projects, frequently include larger or different perspectives. As an example, the study of polarisation phenomenon recently gained in visibility and influence partly thanks to European funding. In fact, the funding of European project on radicalisation is allocated through different ways and public policy axes. The following table abstract copied from the Commission's website provides a great example of the diversity of approaches funded:

<b>Funding instrument</b>	<b>Information on calls and support actions and how to access funding</b>	<b>Search for projects and overviews</b>	<b>Flagship initiatives</b>	<b>Illustrative examples</b>
Internal Security Fund (ISF) - Police	<p>Direct management:</p> <p><i>Calls for proposals</i></p> <p><i>Calls for tenders</i></p> <p>Shared management:</p> <p><i>EU states programme</i></p> <p><i>contact sites</i></p>	List of projects awarded based on calls for proposals	<p>Radicalisation Awareness Network</p> <p>Civil Society Empowerment Programme</p> <p>European Strategic Communication Network</p>	<p>BOUNCE 1 and 2</p> <p>LIAISE 1 and 2</p> <p>BE SAFE (Mobile intervention teams) (funded under</p>

			(ESCN)	decentralised ISF)
The Justice Programme	<i>Calls for proposals</i> Funding and Tenders Portal - JUST	Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals (HELP) Europris  Europris Confederation of European Probation	European Judicial Network	PREPARE / EU-CoE HELP /PRALT / STRENGTHENING / DERAD / COUNTERADHUB/ RISKTRACK / ELMIP/ ENM/ ERA / DARE / TREC / FAIR / J-S.A.F.E/ FIGHTERR  Database and Assessment of Risks of Violent Extremists: DARE project  PREVENTING RADICALIZATION IN DETENTION -AUSTRIA
ERASMUS+	Calls for tenders and proposals	Projects	European Solidarity Corps Erasmus+ Virtual Exchange Toolkit for Youth Workers #BeInclusive EU Sport Award Radicalization Prevention in Prisons	United we stand against radicalization  CHRISCountering Human RADICALISATION In School  Mladinska izmenjava  Youth Empowerment and Innovation project (YEIP)
European Social Fund (ESF)	How to participate	Projects	Youth Employment Initiative	Young East Project
EU Programme for Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI)	Calls for proposals	Projects		New Eurodiaconia study on the Prevention of Violent Extremism out now  Eurocities  EU Convince
The Cohesion Fund	Fundings	Projects		Vienna is helping refugees to integrate

Horizon 2020 (Research)	Horizon 2020 Framework Programme	Projects	MindB4Act Pericles Practices, Trivalent  Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality (DARE)  RED-Alert GREASE Tensor  BRaVE: Building Resilience against Violent Extremism and Polarisation (CSA)
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)	How it works	Projects	
European Regional Development Fund	DG REGIO Grants and Procurements	Projects	Urban Innovative Action URBACT III programme
Europe creative	How it works	Projects	
Rights Equality and Citizenship Programme	How it works		
The Connecting Europe Facility	How it works		Digital Service Infrastructure for making a better and safer internet for kids

This presentation shows that radicalisation prevention is a growing concern at least since 2004 in the European territory. Some of the interrogations pushed forward by the first group of experts were not resolved, such as the existence or not of links between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ points of views and organisations, or the relevance in using ‘radicalisation’ in order to tackle terrorism issues while the term also carries positive change possibilities. However, the dense relations that were fostered between stakeholders and frontline practitioners allow a continuous transnational dialogue about what is radicalisation and how to prevent it.

The European realm may not be one of concrete action for it is too complex to implement such programs at such a scale considering the differences of the phenomenon in each member state. However, it is one of exchange and dialogue pushed forward by the European institutions, member states and civil society. In that sense, the work of the commission is one of support and compilation of initiatives and reports in which we have to keep thinking as one of the major resources both for developing and confronting one’s approach. The role of the Commission and the possibilities of

acting at a European level mainly consist in coordination and dissemination of knowledge and good practices.

This scale of coordination and resources' promotion is densely connected to national and local actions though. As shown in the presentation of the national radicalisation prevention policies, the efforts to articulate different scales of actions is one of the priority of the programs developed. This surely is linked to the promotion of radicalisation realised by the Commission, but local and national contexts also led stakeholders to include this topic in their agenda. In fact, radicalisation prevention programs are often elaborated and voted after traumatic events or the raise of concerning issues. These issues and events participate to shape these policies as we can see in the case of France (focus on Islamism after raise of departures to Syria and 2015 attacks), Austria (with the actual turn after Islamist attack) although the terms in which they are interpreted have recently emerged. In fact, we acknowledged that the partners involved in Rad2Citizen all knew political violence and terrorism for long but only recently developed radicalisation prevention policies recently, in the mid- and late-2010'.

These policies are characterised by the focus they bring on the necessity of multi-agency and scale cooperation, especially between security and prevention actors. The actual actors evoked and included in the plans and strategies then depend on the approach developed by each country and local stakeholders. The balance between violence and ideological issues varies but these keep on defining the strategies. In France, the focus on the youth and on jihadism and Islamism led to the development of counter-narratives and detection strategies implying educational services (schools, educators, etc.). The ideological aspect is central as the new "separatism" law and prevention actions associated do no longer refer to violence itself but to identity issues for citizens called to endorse republican values. In Greece, it is political violence that constitute the main focus. Hate crime and criminal regulation thus take a greater place as security forces do. In Austria, the main focus is on democracy and citizenship. This holistic approach leads to a greater focus on societal polarization, citizen's trust in society and imply the involvement of more educational and political actors. Violence is then evoked as a symptom of a larger lack of democratic values. In Spain, the long history with regional separatism movements and the 2004 attacks reinforced the focus on terrorist violence as a mean of action for specific political groups. Intelligence strategy and security forces are thus the main actor involved in radicalisation prevention.

The present analysis has to raise our awareness about the different background from which we all act, including inside Rad2Citizen project. They also foster our capacity to better understand each other and the proposition and ways of working on radicalisation we make. The analysis of Toulouse Métropole (WP3) and Malaga's territories (WP5) should be facilitated by this chapter. Definitions and considerations about issues to be tackled have already been marked by these backgrounds and this contributions aims at providing keys for understanding the cultural negotiation process in which we have mainly implicitly been engaged since January 2020.

The definitions used in Rad2Citizen project are original, strongly based on the recent academic and non-academic literature, but it should not be considered as neutral or objective. They reveal the goals we are aiming at and the concerns on which we wish to bring the light. They are also a contribution to feed the debates and analysis on radicalisation phenomena and their prevention.

# Metropolitan Analysis

## Prevention actors : a cartography

Since the beginning of this project a great number of stakeholders and frontline practitioners have been met and interviewed. These encounters had to be systematised and organised in order to present an overview of the actors who possibly have an impact in terms of prevention and social cohesion. The following lines will describe these actors and their action following two criterion: the degree to which we can consider they contribute to radicalisation prevention and their connexions with other institutions.

### Public institutions committed with prevention

In last report, we presented local policies since 2012 and evoked some of the key actors. The objective here will be do foster our understanding of these actor's activities, definitions and realm of action.

#### *The Prefecture*

The prefecture is the representation of the State in each department, placed under the authority of the minister of home affairs. As such, its jurisdiction includes security policies, notably regarding crime and terrorism issues. The prefectures are also, since 2014, the leading actors for the application of radicalisation and separatism prevention policies. This policy is led in Haute-Garonne by the prefect himself, his principal private secretary, the head of the department of security and prevention and two policy officers. Since the role of the prefecture in funding initiatives, the role of the GED, CPRAF and CLIR have been clarified in D3.3.-1. (pp. 18-20), we will now focus on the role of the prefecture in terms of **network building** and **security forces management**.

Both security forces (police and gendarmerie) are under the authority of the prefect. Different types of services have to be distinguished:

- Criminality, especially drug trafficking repression
- Intelligence services, divided in two scales: national intelligence (DGSI) directly involved in the surveillance of potential terrorist activities, and local intelligence services, in charge of local affairs, usually more interested in analysing local configurations of political and religious groups. The latter services use a definition closer to that of "separatism", the first mainly focuses on violent extremism.

The security forces are directly concerned by radicalisation issues both in their common work, as they may experience situations of extreme violence, sometimes fuelled by ideological or social motivations, and during specifically focused activities. Thus, the data they produce (registered criminal acts, urban violence, etc.) may help us grasp radical violence issues as well as the analysis these services developed.

In Toulouse Métropole, there seems to be little communication between security services and other local actors about radicalisation. It may have not always been the case, and a series of procedures are currently being discussed to foster this communication on the basis of a circular published on November 13<sup>th</sup> 2018.

Since 2018, the reinforcement of police forces in Le Mirail labelled as a QRR includes the work of a “police-population” officer in charge of evaluating and strengthening the preventive work of the police in relation with its local partners (social workers, educators, schools, etc.). These officers are often retired agents. They are responsible for duty periods for citizens to communicate more easily with the police services.

In terms of network building, the prefecture of Haute-Garonne have once built a solid network of professionals around radicalisation prevention but this network is actually not active any more. In 2021 the policy officer invited “referents” for radicalisation prevention of major institutions for a meeting. These meetings are an opportunity to report each institution’s activities and resources but it only happened once. As a consequence, most of the network building work held by the prefecture consists in the GED-CPRAF-CLIR that is, discussions about specific or individual cases that allow little time for confronting views or elaborating common strategies.

To sum up, the prefecture is a key actor meant to be leading radicalisation prevention on the department. Despite a relatively narrow definition of the terms for themselves, the work they do with the reported people and the funds they dispatch are covering a wide range of approaches. The prefecture is identified by the national policy as the leader actor for radicalisation prevention. However, in Haute-Garonne, its action is limited to fund dispatching and situation resolution. Network building, as we will see, is mainly held by other actors.

### ***The Conseil Départemental***

The Conseil Départemental of Haute-Garonne (CD31) is another key actor as a local authority. Its jurisdiction does not include any security issue. However, its role in terms of education (responsible for the management of public secondary schools) and citizenship allowed it to develop a “Republican principles” politic that is mainly declined for colleges (see D3.3.-1., pp.26-27) and through public events and visual campaigns. The question of radicalisation have been especially concerning for the sport and education departments of the CD31. The uses of the term though, is slightly different from the prefecture and focuses on the influence that people or groups may have on the youngsters who are included in sport associations or private schools.

In addition to these missions, the CD31 is responsible for child welfare on its territory. This includes child and family support and a reporting system named CRIP (Concerning Information Gathering Cell). The CRIP gathers reported cases of in danger children and classifies them. In that sense, it can treat radicalisation issues that fit its definition.

### ***Toulouse Métropole and the municipalities***

Toulouse Métropole and the municipalities that compose it are local authorities engaged in preventing radicalisation and violence and in promoting social cohesion. Specific services can be mobilised both for analysing and acting in violence prevention.

The municipalities’ jurisdiction does include public order and all of them have a municipal police. The definition of what radicalisation / radicality is varies a lot from a municipal team to another. It depends on the political orientation of the municipal team and on field experiences with the term.

One of the municipalities, for example, refuses to use “radical” based words as it considers these terms as potentially stigmatising and discriminating. In another, the project was warmly welcomed and hopes were expressed in terms of social cohesion. However, radicalisation seems not to be a major concern for these services who usually lead with public order and forms of violence that are not considered “radicals”. Some of the actors may use the term “radical” to talk about specific actions during social protests but these too are usually more concerning national security forces.

Some municipalities developed a specific prevention policy through what is called a Local Council for Crime Prevention and Security (CLSPD). The date of creation of the CLSPD varies a lot depending on the municipality, also does its role. CLSPDs are meant to be communication spaces between security forces and prevention actors such as social workers and local representatives. In some cases, they allow the reflection and elaboration of prevention strategies and service articulations. However, this is only possible after each institution acknowledges the others and their respective professional culture and deontology. Some CLSPDs already tackled radicalisation prevention issues, especially in three cities: Cugnaux, Tournefeuille and Colomiers. However, the working group seems to have stopped its activities. At a metropolitan level, a coordination body was created in 2002 and re-configured in 2017, the CMSPD. Its role is to stimulate and support CLSPDs by heading specific thematic workshops and resources. In Toulouse Métropole, it has been dealing with radicalisation issues since 2017, organising training sessions and seminars. It also works on gender based violence prevention, youth judicial prevention, etc.

The metropolis, since 2017, has in charge a specific social jurisdiction on marginalisation prevention of the youth called specialised prevention. Specialised prevention is a public service mission within the framework of child welfare. It is a specific form of action, combining educational action and social presence in different territories of Toulouse Métropole, to support marginalized, disrupted and disadvantaged young people aged between 11 and 25. To support them, there are 11 teams, namely called “prevention clubs”, that are located on the different Toulouse territories. The specialised educators who are working in those clubs accompany the youngsters with other actors, depending on their needs. Confronted to situations of violence and hate speeches, the specialised prevention of Toulouse Métropole decided to tackle radicalisation issues in 2016 creating a workgroup composed of an educator of each club. This workgroup allowed much discussions on what should or should not be called radicalisation, what are the information that can or cannot be transmitted to other services, how to tackle these issues from an educational perspective etc. Since 2020, the service also created a specific team composed by two educators specialised on these issues. They act supporting youngsters and other professionals when hate speech, conspiracy theories or other issues connected to radicalisation appear.

### ***The CAF (Child benefit fund)***

The CAF is a departmental (Haute-Garonne) institution aiming at allocating child benefit to families who need and request it. We already detailed its implication in funding radicalisation prevention actions in D3.3.-1. We will now focus on its action as a local actor which can be declined in two : the allocation of the funds to families and management of beneficiaries data, and its direct social action through social centres.

The allocation of the funds allows the CAF to observe variations in the needs of the families on a given territory, but also to notice sudden rise or decrease of the demands from potential

beneficiaries, which can indicate changes in the resources used by families, or a change in their situations. In that sense, CAF is an important actor while analysing local needs and resources.

The Social Centres are usually physical structures (building) situated inside areas that concentrate poverty and precarity. They can be actually managed by municipalities, associations or directly by the CAF but the status of social centres depends on the attribution of the label by the CAF. There are 18 social centres in Toulouse, most of them managed by associations. In the other cities of Toulouse Métropole, social centres are usually managed by the municipality or integrated to the Communal Centres for Social Action (CCAS). The geographical situation and the social work of these structures allow the professionals who work there to develop a sharp vision of the districts in terms of social needs and territorial problematics. They are, thus, a priority actor while analysing and describing general atmosphere and specific phenomenon.

### ***The ARS (Regional Health Agency)***

The ARS is the coordination body of the health public policy which is independent from the prefecture. Its jurisdiction includes the management of hospitals and health prevention policies at a regional level (Occitanie). The ARS-Occitanie founded, in 2018, a resource centre in mental health for radicalisation prevention (CRESAM). This unique structure support professionals by training and supervision focused on situation-based meetings and network-building. In 2021, they also launched a specific research project in order to improve their supervision and advising capacity which is aimed at understanding “biographical configurations” that can lead to radical violences.

Their network building consists in a trimester encounter of all the institutions engaged in radicalisation prevention. This agenda was disturbed by the COVID-19 crisis but two encounters happened, which allowed some actors (Toulouse Métropole, PJJ, Prison services) to present their actions and lay the basis for further partnership.

### ***Academy of Toulouse***

The educational system in France lies on a regional network, different from the political one. Each region according to this system is called an “academy”. The academy of Toulouse is one of them, its frontiers go beyond Toulouse Metropole and Haute-Garonne but includes it. The chief education officer lead the national policy at the academy level, with assistants in every department. There is, both at the academy level and the department level, a referent for radicalisation issues. Their role is to ensure the training of the agents of the academy and the management of field reports about radicalisation.

Most of these reports regard conflictual situations with pupils and laicity issues (Donnet 2020). However, the assassination of Samuel Paty, a secondary school teacher, in October 2020, reinforced the sensation of vulnerability of the agents and their sensibility to radicalisation issues. Samuel Paty was a history and geography teacher. He was killed by a man days after showing caricatures of the prophet Mohammed in class to support a civic education session about freedom of speech. The attack had a national impact and the profession was hardly shaken.

So far, it seems that the Academy does not participate to the networks (led by the prefecture or the CRESAM) in place. They use their own reporting system and have a specific task force for security

and laicity cases. However, it is present, and one of the key actors of the CEPRAF both for supporting the reported people and for bringing new cases, mostly focusing on laicity issues, disputes about the courses content (notably about religion and the creation of the world) and violence cases with polarised discourses, especially when these contain religious aspects.

### ***The Justice/PJJ/SPIP***

As the educational system, the justice system is declined in specific territories. In this presentation, I will separate three domains of the judiciary action: usual justice led by the Tribunal of Toulouse in a territory broader than the metropolitan area, minor's justice which works as a specific educational jurisdiction in three departments, and the carceral institution.

First of all, it is important to remember that radicalisation is not a legal concept, it has no existence in the civil or penal code. Also, terrorism cases are centralised in Paris. Thus, the tribunal of Toulouse does not develop specific radicalisation prevention actions. However, some crimes are treated with a specific attention, especially the crime of apology, which is treated with citizenship trainings. Other cases can present ideological issues or radical violence, including intra-familial violence, hate crimes etc. These also are requiring special attention.

In France, minors' justice is separated from common justice. Penal responses are judged non adapted for this public, whose crimes are though through an educational framework. The PJJ (judicial youth protection) is an institution aimed at ensuring educational support for minors responsible for crimes. Although radicalisation is not a crime *per se*, the framing of radicalisation that present the youth as a potential vulnerable public led the PJJ to develop a specific approach on the subject. At a the inter-departmental level, two supporting professionals are in charge of laicity and radicalisation, ensuring the training of the educators, actual support in the analysis of the situations and a global reflection about what radicalisation is and how to prevent it, in association with a national network. The PJJ is one of the most active actors in direct contact with the public. They support youth judged for radicalisation-linked crimes (apology, violence in the name of an ideology etc.) and also youth judged for "common crimes" and reported inside the institution as potentially radicalised. The educational approach allows specific questions not that much about ideology and belief but on how these persons build their identity and ways of acting and living in their environment. In that sense, although the PJJ is a judicial institution, its definition of the problematics goes much deeper than responsibility issues and allows discussions about the environment building and territory action of the metropolis.

The carceral institution constitute the third pole of the judiciary institution. As the tribunal and the PJJ, the agents in the prison system have to tackle radicalisation issues directly linked to crime qualifications and common crime authors who present side radicalisation issues, that is, who generate anxiety formulated in these terms. There is, in each region, an interdisciplinary support duo, generally composed of an educator and a psychologist. They intervene when required by the common agents. Their role is to spot, meet and evaluate the persons and to propose actions for their management.

### ***The University***

Among important actors in radicalisation prevention are the researchers and academic actors. Their concerns about radicalisation are likely to be different from those of the public actors directly involved in prevention and security issues. Nonetheless, their impact is to be noticed. In Toulouse, all three universities are engaged in a research platform called “Radicalisation and Regulation”. This platform’s objective is to put in common resources and research interest about radicalisation and its prevention. Most researcher of the field are included in the platform, with various research interests and disciplinary approaches: sociology, politics, communication, psychology, education, etc. Supported by national research institutions as the CNRS (National Centre for Scientific Research) and MSHS (Social Sciences ‘House’), it leads a training program included in the agenda of the CNRS.

Part of the researchers of the platform are also developing training and support actions individually. They may be mobilised by municipalities or other organisms (associations, public institutions...) in order to bring elements of definition. It is difficult to summarise their definition or point of view because of the diversity the platform hosts, but most of the researchers of the platform mainly approach radicalisation by analysing terrorists and radical violences’ authors trajectories and psycho-social profiles.

## Civil Society raising awareness

Presenting local institutional actors was necessary to identify the potential partners and synergies among public services. However, this cartography would be incomplete if it wouldn’t include civil society actors. In fact, in the last ten years, important actors emerged engaging in training programs, testimonies and even research programs and prevention at a local, national and European scale. More actors, not based in Toulouse, also participate to the dynamics of prevention. As we may show.

### *Imad*

“IMAD, association for the youth and for peace” is an association founded by Latifa Ibn Ziaten, mother of Imad Ibn Ziaten, one of the militaries killed in 2012 in Toulouse attacks. The aim of the association is to promote peace and social cohesion for the youth. Its actions are mainly based on testimonies and debates in secondary schools in France. However, it seems like this association works very little with the rest of the network presented above.

### *Les Militants du savoir (Knowledge Activists)*

Les militants du savoir is a local association also active in some other cities in Occitanie. It works mainly with media education workshops, sport and citizenship etc. It is mainly composed of academics and works with a vision of radicalisation prevention through the idea of citizenship and education. It is engaged both in research projects (mainly about memories of terrorist attacks and educational aspects of radicalisation processes) and prevention actions on the territory.

### *Syrien ne bouge agissons*

This association was founded by Dominique Bons, mother of a young boy who was recruited by the ISIS organisation and departed for Syria, and deceased little time afterward. First engaged in a European network of mothers who acted for the national policies to change in order to protect their children, the association diversified its action. It supports families in similar situations, organises seminars and training sessions and participates to projects, including the European project CEAR.

Many of its actions are led with an association professionalised in radicalisation prevention: Preveanet.

### ***Prevanet***

Prevanet is an association based in Paris. It organises many webinars, workshops with professionals and youngsters, and training programs in France. It is mainly focused on recruiting techniques and Islamist online propaganda. Prevanet, helped by Syrien ne bouge agissons, is currently trying to find financial supports in the Toulouse region in order to develop its professional activity in radicalisation prevention.

All these actors may know each other and even work together, but there is little coordination at a metropolitan level, and little coordination at all despite networking efforts. Most cooperation usually happen at a more localised and situation-based scale. It is thus necessary to understand more precisely the actors' networks that structure each local territory.

## **Local Networks**

At a local level, social workers and security forces form specific networks that have their originalities and habits. Some already work tightly together, others don't. Two main services are in charge of ensuring their coordination: the CLSPD already mentioned, the DAT (Territorial Action Head) which is a service of the city of Toulouse especially concerned by urban priority areas. Another service, jointly managed by the Academy of Toulouse and the city of Toulouse aims at coordinating educational actions in priority areas.

It is thus necessary to precise how local prevention networks are meshed in order to provide efficient analysis and recommendation. As this parts require a great precision, it will be further developed in D3.6.-3.

## Conclusion

Rad2Citizen is a project in evolution. It includes, in its initial terms and views, the possibility to discuss and reform concepts, methodology and part of its objective in function of what is judged the most relevant in order to achieve its main goal : a better understanding of radicalisation dynamics at a territorial level and the possibilities for its prevention. This second report is, in this regard, a great example that shows our capacity to adapt to each other and to the actual possibilities that emerge, or not, in the fieldwork, among local actors, and with the support of the commission and european partners involved in the project.

The evolution of the indicators is one of the examples of this. It is a process of adaptation of both theory and practices that aims at fostering our cooperation and sharpen our sight. This process though, is still in progress and will be continued in next reports.

The presentation of national policies are part of this process, it was an crucial intermediate step that allowed us to clarify the inputs expected and actually possible. At the same time, it allowed a deep reflection on our mutual views and positions.

In next reports, this work will continue to be held in such an adaptative way. D3.3.-3., will be published in march 2022. It will be an opportunity to present the first qualitative data and results at a metropolitan level. We should stabilise the sets of data needed for the constitution of the indicators and apply it to Toulouse Métropole. The presentation of these boards of indicators will then be presented to local and European actors for evaluation (D.3.2.) through the edition of a manual (D3.1.) and during interviews and workgroups.



## Extremism, Radicalisation, Citizenship

PROJECT N°:871092

### Analysis Report – 3

DELIVERABLE N°: 3.3.-3.



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# — Induction as an operational method

While realising the interviews and focus group as part of the qualitative methodology, it appeared that the definitions that we had built between partners of the rad2citizen project were not directly applying. Instead, professionals and inhabitants exposed their experience with their daily words and concepts. Trying to acknowledge this experience and translate it for prevention purposes, induction was a precious tool.

## What is induction ?

In social sciences, induction is a mode of knowledge production:

Induction and deduction refer to two procedures of reasoning. **Induction is the process of passing from the particular (observed facts, singular cases, experimental data, situations) to the general** (a law, a theory, a general knowledge). Deduction is the almost opposite process of concluding (deducing) a statement from hypotheses, premises or a theoretical framework: the conclusions are formally derived from these premises or theory. (Martin, 2012)

Both modes are models and never apply perfectly, but their articulation defines the nature of the analysis that will follow. We always begin research work with something in mind, if not a formalized hypothesis, a general idea, a sensibility to certain objective or imagined phenomenon etc. In that sense, research is always deductive in a way, which is why the exposition of the motives of the researchers and their institution are important. In our case, the grant agreement and every document since the beginning of the project state that **our interest is oriented toward violence** of a specific type, that is linked to ideological content or groups polarization on a given territory. In the course of our discussions, analysing most recent literature about extremism and radicalization, we realized that the ideological content itself is not as important as its mode of diffusion and the actions that it supports. More specifically, **authors show that ideologies are less and less formed content disseminated by big organisations** that one would join, and more and more a question of mixed references in small or medium groups. This first statement caused us troubled and made us choose a wider definition of our object, which became “**radical violence**”, that is, violence caused by and causing a weakening of social cohesion at the scale of a democratic society. This second formulation, however, is still a hypothesis, made before any encounter with local public or experience.

Induction, thus, defines the way we used to experience these encounters.

In fact, we listen to them, and the recommendation I make to my students, because I think it's the best one, is that after a certain time, when they think they are comfortable enough and know the essential elements of a society, it's to stop asking questions, but to listen to what people say. Because **when you ask a question, you are going to pre-form the nature of the answer** you are going to get. (Descola, 2019)

In other words, instead of just testing our hypothesis (that radical violence is a relevant category to describe reality), we preferred to allow **an enlargement of the research problematics** through the inclusion of actual contextualised experiences reported by different actors. We conducted interviews with professionals, representatives and inhabitants. While we had elaborated some indicators and research questions, it was necessary to measure the difference between those and the representations of our interviewees, and the differences between the representations of the interviewees themselves. Such an approach allowed us to grasp what is considered as violent in the chosen environments and in function of different positions. Then, we tested again these points of view by comparing them between them and with some quantitative data.

With such a methodology, we do not consider any of the narratives reported as “representative” but, in each of them, we tried to spot what could be **“significant” points**.

This approach, as we will show, is not only valuable for consolidating our results, it is also the best way to engage a prevention process through **recognition of the experienced violence and focusing on actual local actor’s concerns**. In fact, while many researches on radicalisation tend to come to results by collecting answers to questions that do not make sense for the interviewees, we first wanted to **build common sense** on what we should be concerned with.

## Why induction for analysing radical violence ?

### Building common sense

Some of the assertions stated in the project’s documents are heard and read so often that they ended being considered obvious. The need to intervene for preventing radicalisation is one of them. However, these assertions built and disseminated by a community of researchers, security entrepreneurs and stakeholders may not be shared by grass-root practitioners for many reasons. This reality was a first shock that made the production of qualitative data difficult.

One of the most common comments to our presence and questions, especially by inhabitants and professionals, was referring to the very relevance of the topic we investigate and the way we do it.

I asked an association of families on the district to participate, but they did not see what they could say about radicalisation. Your demand, to say it in a more direct way, seems thrust from above for us too actually. (Focus group with a practitioner and an inhabitant)

This statement is quiet representative of the many reactions of suspicion and rejection that we experienced while doing our work. We could look for many reasons for them, lying in ethic values of educators, as it was pointed out by Manuel Boucher in the report he realized in the WP4, in inhabitants’ distrust toward institutions, especially local ones, or in the misunderstanding of our position as a European project held by the metropolitan crime prevention service. However, even after having overcome the main trust issues, it appeared that a fundamental point had to be taken into consideration: **radicalisation and derived words is not a term used by local actors to describe daily experience, even of socially or culturally structured violence**. This may be one of

our more important findings: more than twenty years after the (re)emergence of the term in the United States of America and after eight years of a French public policy of radicalisation prevention, **this term still does not generate common sense** on fundamental issues for living together and violence prevention. This does not mean that actual issues do not exist or are denied or ignored, but they are apprehended through other vocabularies, that carry other implicit values.

More important: while we were contacting local actors, many of them began the discussions by stating that, for them, “religions, and Islam, are not the problem”. This point is especially relevant if we consider the fact that, most of the time, religion was not cited from our part.

## Religions and its stigma

This statement has to be understood by considering the position of many actors, between a nation state’s discourse mainly focused since at least 2014 on jihadist radicalisation processes and a local reality of cohabitation between religions and communities.

Using the term “radicalisation”, we unintentionally carried conflicts of values and observed it being actualised in context. The fact that we, as an institution were systematically associated to these polemics reveals that the choice of working on these issues was a political act as such, perceived as potentially Islamophobic by many actors, especially professionals in contact with Muslim and non-Muslim public.

This said, those who accepted to discuss the terms of our action gave us important insights, sometimes contradictory, about different territories. As we progressively abandoned the term “radicalisation”, issues appeared regarding religious questions: what is laicity and how to cope with neutrality as public agents? What to do with religious signs and claims in different contexts, etc. These issues were tackled as essential to social cohesion and not as actual violence, that is, as issues that have to be tackled with calm and discernment in order not to generate polarization where, we saw it, tensions already existed.

Researching more deeply, the actual role of religion for social cohesion and in terms of prevention appears to be ambiguous. Though most religious leaders seem to have important mediation roles at local levels, the Muslim population in many contexts appeared separated *de facto*. Many non-Muslim actors, not referring about religion itself but about believers, used the term “community”, usually with a connotation of withdrawal from the general society. The use of this term does not reflect the diversity of points of view and ways to believe and practice a religion, but the very existence of such discourses is an indicator for us. Knowing if this “withdrawal” is actually occurring from the point of view of those who live it would be necessary here.

## Defining radical violences bottom-up

If we define, as we did, radical violences as forms of violences that are both cause and consequence of social cohesion on a given territory, then understanding the global experience of the territory and the use of local categories for what is and what is not violence is essential. Which is why, from the

interviews, focus groups and direct experiences, three categories emerge from the analysis, and concrete types of experiences.

## Safety : from indicators to sensibility

The first category that we will have in mind while describe what makes sense in terms of radical violence for local actors is the notion of safety as proposed by Heiko Berner:

Safety thus means at the same time (1) the safety of each individual participant in a community (protection from being excluded); (2) as a result, the safety of the community (spatial safety; “a safe district”); and (3) if applied to a wide range, social security as the sum of many instances of local safety.

Nevertheless, one must also consider different understandings of safety based on experiences and relationships that extend beyond a concrete local context, as well as import situational demands in a local context based on outside influences (Bonacker 2021). Safety is a concept that mediates these different understandings and provides a framework for community residents to negotiate their perspectives. (Berner, 2022)

This notion will help us pass from indicators to sensibilities and their articulations at the scale of a district and a metropolis. How do actors define their own safety and these of the others? Such a concept allows us to consider how considerations do cross each other. An example of that would be the testimony of professionals who observe a decrease in public’s solicitations while the global economic situation, especially in their district, seems to worsen. “How do these people live?” Two conclusions can be drawn from this little example:

First, in such a context, this decrease in accessing to their right could mean a decrease in the technical accessibility of these rights (due to digitalisation, the closure of proximity services, etc.) and, thus, a decrease in actual trust, that is trust in actions.

Second, and consequently, the concern of this professional and its implicit part can be summarised that way: if individual safety (1) implies the activation of a specific community (2), does this mean that the wider society (3) is, in fact (and not necessarily intentionally or for ideological reasons), weakened by its incapacity to address social demand, especially in times of health and climate crisis? In this case, access to right should be considered a priority not only for people to get resources, but also as a way to articulate different levels of “safety” and prevent fragmentation and possible polarisation.

## « Feeling home »

Perhaps one of the most striking manifestations of the need for safety is summed up by an inhabitant who went to a Rad2Citizen discussion group to report the occupation of her building hall by drug users: "we don't feel at home!". Let us understand the force of this expression, which brings together traumatic experiences (witnessing weapons violence) with an intrusion into a space of


transition between the public and the private, sheds light on what a policy of prevention and safety can mean.

"Feeling at home" is much more than feeling safe in the hall of a building. It is about ensuring a coherent relationship between a supportive neighbourhood life with which one identifies and the material possibility of remaining in that environment.

## Meanings and Identification

The last title, therefore, is "Meaning and identification processes". In other words, the ways of inhabiting a specific environment. I have highlighted one tension for this inhabitant, but there are others. Between neighbourhood life, future prospects and the stigmatisation of certain areas, for example. More broadly, what we call polarisation, i.e., identification with world views that are constructed by making enemies (whatever they may be), is an essential factor in understanding and acting on territories, sometimes very simply, by embodying these figures in real human beings for example.

Stigmatised territories as priority areas always appeared to struggle with stigma.



"Some things work here, you know!  
There is more than violence here, a lot of solidarity and friendship!  
We are not in the Bronx!"

These captions from local actors and inhabitants willing to highlight positive aspects of their districts suggest that they expect institutions to focus only on these aspects. A recent study<sup>1</sup> about the representation of priority areas on twitter actually shows that Toulouse, and especially the Mirail are over-represented, mainly through a negative image of violence on these districts. This has to make us think about how to focus our action on these territories and how it can generate negative identifications.

In other districts, especially new districts pressurised by the growth of the metropolitan population, the question of identification has to be made another way: how new inhabitants can identify to their new neighbourhood, through what kind of social or cultural actions? Sometimes, municipalities or even older neighbourhoods feel unsafe about the arrival of new populations, especially if this population is marked by the stigma of a former territory (priority area), or the colour of its skin. In these cases, how to create positive meaning and access to full citizenship? These questions cannot be ignored, at least in a democracy.

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1 ONPV, Les quartiers prioritaires de la politique de la ville sur twitter, juillet 2022

## Actual concerns and phenomenon

If we define, as we did, radical violences as forms of violences that are both cause and consequence of a weakening social cohesion, not only can we observe general dynamics as those underlined in the latest part, but we can also identify actual phenomena that are especially at risk.

Contrary to the CIPDR, which consider Islamism as a major risk for social cohesion and drug trafficking as question of criminality only, we will not evoke here the first one, for which little material has been gathered (only on one territory), and focus on safety issues that appeared major in all the territories: criminal organisation of the territory, demography and subsequent mobility, and finally inadequacies between specific needs and resources on the territories.

### Drug trafficking related issues

Drug trafficking may be the most concerning topic both in each territory and at a metropolitan level. We will here summarise the concerns of inhabitants and professionals.

For inhabitants, drug trafficking is rarely constructed as an issue as such. It is the associated problems caused by its organisation that is pointed out: the use of public space and capacity to threat inhabitants in case of conflict, noise, use of weapons, etc. It is the capacity of criminal organisations to vindicate an exclusive use of the territory that is problematic because it makes people unable to “feel at home”.

For professionals, things go a little deeper, because the involvement of youngsters poses ethical and moral contradictions to educators and, in some cases, the vindication for an exclusive use of the territory forces professionals to adapt to criminal organisations and even negotiate the use of public space.

In any case, the concepts presented above are still relevant: from social vulnerabilities of the youngsters that makes them enter the criminal organisation, social vulnerabilities of the other users of the public space, to the offers that exist to restore safety in many situations (through the mobilisation of institutions, through direct use of force, through pedagogy, etc.). In any case, it is the formation of solidarity networks, including or excluding certain agents (as public institutions), considering them as allies or enemies. that defines the level of social cohesion and, thus, the level of safety from individual to societal.

### Demographic dynamics and Mobility

As stated before, demography is crucial aspect of social cohesion at a metropolitan level. In fact, at least three territories in the metropolis are impacted by the important demographic growth: the metropolis balance of population is positive by around 15.000 inhabitants per year. Depending on the characteristics of the arriving population, they will not select the same district to live: students will prefer the city centre, migrants with low income may go to the Mirail, the districts, in that sense, are operating some kind of segregation based on multiple factors: rental prices, foreigners' networks, etc. On the same time, the urban renovation project in le Mirail pushes its population on

the margins of Toulouse and does not allow the installation of massive new populations. The population and former population of le Mirail, carrying the stigma of their district, generate concerns among inhabitants and municipalities of arrival. At least three districts or municipalities underlined that the arrival of these persons were problematic, reproducing the stigma or pointing at local actors who does.

This flow of population, however, also generate more objective considerations: for those who will not be in a process of social accension, are the public services adapted on the territory? For new districts or districts with a traditionally wealthy population, it is a question of access to right and citizenship.

Mobility, at the same time, refers to the intra-metropolitan movements of population between residential areas and activity areas. For example, Andromede is mainly lived as a residential area, which makes difficult the activation of local life. On the contrary, Arnaud Bernard is a territory marked by many different usages by many different populations.

Metropolitan mobility is also seen as a threat when it comes to criminal organisation: in many territories, drug dealers are presented as foreigners to the district, if not to the region. This, in some cases, lead to a reinforcement of stigmatised areas (those from le Mirail) or to a feeling of powerlessness affecting sensation of safety (they are no longer form the district, there is no more social control). In any case, local institutions seem to have some difficulties to adapt their work to the metropolitan context as most of them are focused only on “local life”.

## Professionals, local actors and resources

Last but not least, the former considerations lead us to consider the adequacy of public and private offer and professionals’ tools with the needs identified. Insisting on this point not only allows to understand social environments as balanced ecosystems, but can also help us in orienting resources.

Beyond basic social services, that are sometimes lacking, specific needs can be addressed in order to improve societal cohesion at a local level. Such services or initiatives do not have to be directly put in place by the municipality and, in some cases, it is more profitable to let local private actors act.

For example, one of the reasons pointed out for people not to access to their right was the digitalisation of public services without adequate support for vulnerable populations to digital precarity. Also, most social workers seemed to be too poorly trained on that topic, including many challenges regarding identification to environment and groups through internet and online social networks.

Finally, regarding criminal organisation and drug dealing, professionals seem to be lacking the institutional possibility to propose a coordinate preventive action that would include social and educational support for youngsters at risk, health prevention for consumers and security responses (including security of the professionals and their office).

## Including induction for analysis and efficient prevention

The elements brought above can be summarised in three points that reinforce our choice to choose induction as a central part of our methodology. First its relevance for analysis. It was shown that radicalisation and its semantic field are of little relevance at a local level and can even cause rejection due to some very mediated discourses that associate these words to a form of stigmatisation and Islamophobia. Thus, reconsidering the terms of the analysis trying to start from the experience of actors in order to define relevant topics regarding social cohesion and violence was necessary to make actual conversations possible. By using this method, we were able to focus on actual issues that can actually be framed in terms of radical violence, with a clear gain in terms understanding

Second, the capacity of induction to help us pointing out actual concerns had to be underlined. Beyond analysis, the collaborative construction of the concerns that would be taken into account allowed us to be recognized as a positive actor and even a resource, mainly by professionals on the metropolitan area. This brings us to the third important point: induction as an operational modality of our action has an actual effect to build common sense and, thus, to reinforce social cohesion at least at an institutional and professional level. Not only redefining the terms together allowed us to work more efficiently, but it was part of the process of mutual recognition with our institutional and personal cultures and, beyond this, as members of one democratic society where it is allowed to talk about your own concerns and being recognized and supported through them.

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# — Public Policies, subjectivity, sensibility

## Presentation of the seminar

While developing the activities of the project, one of our local partners in Toulouse Métropole appeared to share some of our reflections regarding the diversity of situations that were evoked in many contexts under the term “radicalisation” and the diversity of “indicators” that were mobilized by local actors. The CRESAM-Occitanie, funded by the Regional Health Agency (ARS) in Occitanie and the Rad2Citizen projects were particularly attentive to the definitions used and the practices that correspond to these definitions. From informal discussions about this variability, we decided to move one step forward and to find a way to make this diversity appear to our partners and to foster our understanding of each practical, theoretical and institutional ways to tackle radicalisation.

The idea of a public workshop or seminar quickly appeared as the best way to fulfil both of our expectations: make each partner reflect and explicit its position on the question “what is it, in our daily work, that we call radicalization?”, and foster the mutual understanding of local partners who often already work together but do not have opportunities to develop real discussions about the meaning of their common work. Sometimes, practitioners themselves do not have opportunity to question or exchange about their missions inside the same institutions. This is the reason why, in order to help fostering the intellectual part of their work and also for academic purposes, we decided to associate another partner, the Superior Institute for the Study of Religions and Laicity (ISERL) and to invite researchers whose work correspond to the institutions of the practitioners invited. Thus, the seminar was co-organised by Toulouse Métropole, the CRESAM-Occitanie, the ISERL, and funded also by the Laboratory of Anthropology of Contemporaneous Stakes (LADEC) and the Doctoral School of Social Sciences of the University of Lyon (ED483).

The idea of the seminar was to be held in two parts: a preparatory part, with only one or two selected practitioners from one institution, a researcher and one of the organisers, and then a public presentation of this work and its discussion among the different “pairs” and other participants.

## Academic-practitioner pairs

Unlike in other countries, common work by researchers and practitioners regarding common concerns or questions is held only rarely in France. Most of the time, especially when it comes to radicalisation issues, researchers are viewed as knowledge holders and their knowledge is punctually passed on to practitioners during “training programs”. This has two negative effects. The first one is that researchers usually avoid direct contact with frontline practitioners or, in the better situations, consider them an “object” of research. Practical knowledge, including the nature of what makes practitioners use the term “radicalisation”, their daily used “indicators” including subtle variations in one-to-one or systemic relations (with families for example) is rarely considered as

such. On the contrary, researchers tend to generate their own categories, that fits their objectives, methods and knowledge production processes. The second effect, on the contrary, regards the difficulty that practitioners experience while using researchers' notions and results. In fact, radicalisation research, if it explores causes and correlations that can have a "radicalisation" effect, usually do not do it from a practical perspective: what are the difficulties this can cause to professionals? How to tackle this question? Etc.

Considering the above-mentioned effects of the lack of common work between researchers and practitioners, we decided to form a series of pairs gathering both depending on their field of action. After exploring what fields could be explored and who could do it, we finally came out with nine actual pairs and an additional intervention due to the refusal to participate from the prefecture.

The objective of these pairs was thus both to keep the reflection close to first line realities and to try to provide adapted concepts that would be both useful and respectful of practitioners' realities and of researchers' academic standards. For doing so, we organized encounters months before the seminar between researchers and practitioners for them to be able to exchange on their views and concerns. These sessions were very fruitful and allowed us to evoke many points of interest that crossed the expectations of the speakers. Also, researchers were invited in function of their experience with the particular institutional milieu at stake so they could bring examples from other local teams or actors and compare their practices and definition.

These encounters were designed to allow the production of a common public intervention by both professionals. Thus, we sought different kinds of articulations for the speakers to bring their own experience and make it valuable and understandable in the light of the other's. This process went through many specific narratives of individual cases or experiences in order to extract the most relevant items.

Here follow the ten institutional milieux explored.

### *Prevention of radicalisation: what sensitivity work for a public policy?*

Bruno Domingo

This first presentation aimed to give an account of the ways in which those in charge of public policies for the prevention of radicalisation can make themselves and their work sensitive to this issue: what mediations are needed to perceive the reality of the territory? What are the links with local, national and international networks of actors?

### *Social cohesion and polarisation: local approaches*

Eric Poinot (Ville et Eurométropole de Strasbourg) and Markus Pausch (Univ. de Salzbourg)

In addition to the de-concentrated approach presented earlier, we returned to the place and action of local actors, in this case a local authority. What effects do specific competences, professional and political cultures have on the ways of understanding the prevention of radicalisation and its manifestations?

## *Counter-Terrorism services and the trial for 13-11 attacks*

Thierry Toutin (Ministry of the Interior) and Antoine Mégie (Univ. de Rouen)

The security and intelligence services are at the heart of policies to prevent radicalisation processes. As such, in charge of informing, monitoring and above all sorting out the reports made by a multitude of actors, the security services mobilise categories of risk that refer to different definitions of the problem of radicalisation. How are these categories mobilised? How do the categories of public action affect the work of these services?

## *Radical risk in prisons and at the end of the sentence*

Roxane Maine, Paola Estesio Quinonero (Adm. Penit. Toulouse) and Thibaut Daussy (Univ. Paris-Saclay)

The prison environment, both open and closed, has been particularly solicited and affected by radicalisation prevention policies. We tried to engage a conversation between practitioners specialised in these issues and a researcher working on the practices of the prison administration in order to better understand the ways in which this administration has been put under pressure in the face of the societal challenges posed by the prevention policy.

## *The National Education and the challenge of radicalisation*

Eva Martinez (Acad. De Toulouse) and Candice Sabadie (Univ. Toulouse 1)

National education is probably one of the institutions most affected by the prevention and educational issues related to radicalisation. This is reflected in internal policies and their place in local and national mechanisms. In contact with young people, how is the experience of radicalisation lived and how do the concerns that take its name arise?

## *Socio-educational support for people reported for radicalisation*

Jean-Michel VRAY (AGASEF) et David Puaud (IIAC)

Since 2014, a series of measures have been developed to support young people reported for radicalisation and their families. Between the original professional cultures, training and awareness of the issue of radicalisation and the specificities of the support provided, we explored how these professionals have found their place in a particular institutional and social network and how contact with the situations reported has shaped their definition of 'radical'.

## *Mental health support: myths and realities about the radical*

Vincent Joris (Rhizome) et Michel Botbol (Univ. de Bretagne Occidentale)

As is often the case when extraordinarily violent acts are committed, the mental health of the perpetrators is questioned. However, if the link between mental disorders and "radical" violent acts is contradicted by specialists in the field, the interest in the psychological dimensions of these pathways is no less topical: how do professionals in the field of psychological health approach the

issue of radicalisation? What problematic categories do they use as a basis for their intervention on the subject?

### *Young Offenders and Radicalisation Risks: Assignment Logics and Educational Practices*

Pierre-Alain Guyot (PJJ) et Jean-Baptiste Pesquet (chargé d'études ENPJJ)

The image of the young delinquent has long dominated the media representation of the "radicalised individual", although the reality is much more heterogeneous. In fact, justice professionals have been led to accompany young people reported as "radicalised" but for acts that cover a wide spectrum of seriousness and dynamics. How have these professionals adapted their intervention? How have the usual categories of intervention with a delinquent public been worked on by them?

### *Specialised prevention, educational issues and radicalisation*

Hamid Tarrabe (Toulouse Métropole) et Thomas Mattei (EHESS)

Specialised prevention was identified very early on as a relevant actor to work on the prevention of different forms of radical violence. Between discussions on the relevance of this notion and what it allows to do, we will ask ourselves how the experience of "street" educational work has fed divergent visions of the question while opening spaces for dialogue within the profession and with other professional fields.

### *Minors returning from the zone: the uncertainty as a concern*

Alessandra Mapelli (Hopital Avicène) et Montassir Sakhi (KU Leuven)

Like the issue of the end of a sentence, the question of returns from combat zones was for a time at the centre of highly mediated debates and continues to worry the actors who may be called upon to accompany the persons concerned. Between ethical questions and concerns about effective support, we will try to understand what is at stake in these very special returns.

## Public sessions

After one, two or more sessions in restrained groups, two days were dedicated to public presentation of the work of the pairs. Our target audience was academic and non-academic. More than 120 persons signed up to participate on site and online and almost 70 were actually present.

Each pair presented its work in 40 minutes and 20 minutes were dedicated to questions and comments from the public, including other pairs.

## A better understanding of concerns and practices

Let us quote the conclusion of the seminar given by Philippe Martin:

To say that there is no consensual, legal, unique, official, scientific definition is a classic topos. There are at least thirteen definitions. Radicalisation is not a criminal offence and a radicalised person is not necessarily a terrorist. In fact, each person constructs the definition not according

to reality but according to his or her competences, his or her sphere of action, his or her missions... The matter is even more fragmented if we look at the diversity of national attitudes.

Some have tried to reduce radicalisation to a mental health problem. But this reductive view is now rejected. The "mental health" determinant is only one aspect. Nor can these radicalised people be reduced to mere delinquents.

During this seminar, we were able to explore both what makes each professional experience unique and specific and what can be a basis for building common sense from a grounded perspective. We will summarise the information gathered in three parts, defined by the type of activities involved.

## Reporting

Radicalisation is not legally punishable, however most definitions exist in the frame of prevention policies and are thus pointing out a negative or even dangerous phenomenon. In such a configuration, as no official "offence" exist, and no clear definition, the reality of radicalisation mostly lies on the characteristics of people reported as such. Security and intelligence services usually spread "indicators" that should worry professionals and families and motivate reporting. Organising "awareness raising" sessions in all the national territory, they guarantee the development sensibilities to objective changes and signals which meant to shape a reporting or "vigilance" culture. In fact, what is or is not an object for reporting is discussed at every level of administration and society and the experience of treating the calls to the reporting platform helps to better understand citizens worries and to re-orient it in function of security issues.

For professionals who work daily with youngsters, the question of reporting also involves more practical questions. Are usual work categories enough to support their public? Are they competent for that and should they report specific cases? These questions led many professionals to adapt part of their practices. Justice child protection, which provide social and educational support to minor offenders, had to work on these issues, as did specialised prevention, and even school professionals. In each case, the category of radicalisation questions the professional limits of the actors and their articulation with specialised services. In each institution, choices have been made to respond the necessity posed both by experiences of youth dynamics of violence and by institutional demands. What should we do, for example, when it becomes a national obligation to organise a minute of silence after terrorist events? Are teachers prepared for that? Does this help social cohesion or is it an opportunity for adolescents to mark their opposition to adults and express some radical positions?

## Evaluation and support

The most directly concerned of the professionals showed us that they were struggling to define the object of their practices. Academic and institutional definition may seem clear However, radicalisation is not a crime, and weather it is an issue at all should be more often questioned. Radical positions for the defence of democracy, and even use of violence have shaped the history of our political culture in a positive way. Radicalisation, in the way it is more often used by

practitioners (and academics) however rather refer to some worries or uncertainties regarding specific intersubjective relationship between a person evaluated and an evaluator.

Psychiatric issues have been one of the trends for explaining radicalisation, we understood during this seminar that both “psychiatric issues” and “radicalisation” are hard to define. Consequently, a measure of radicalisation is impossible to establish, which establishes terrorism as a highly uncertain risk, because of its human factor.

Security services use to recommend letting evaluation to “specialists” but we also realised that these specialists are in fact working on a basis of doubt and subjectivity. Instead of evaluation, most professionals addressing these issues from an educational perspective prefer the idea of processual support. Their professional identity evolved a lot while they were confronted to these issues, but affirming a socio-educational position is still a milestone for those who are in direct contact with a public labelled as “radicalised”, even in prison.

### Living together in a “vigilant” society?

The contributions about local authorities and national public policies also helped us better understand radicalisation as a more general context, linked to social cohesion and the way we choose to foster it. The recent turn of the French public policies around “separatism” is one example, defining clearly Islamists as enemies, but other choices are actually made both at a European level, a local level and at professional communities’ level. The tension is important between “being vigilant” and “being attentive” and the discussions about what exactly is reporting a radicalisation situation enlightened us on that point.

But what about all those situations that we do not need to report, because they do not represent a security threat, but represent for the professional who experience it a real issue, a challenge difficult to overcome? Here also, the limits of radicalisation were reached and pointed out, as a powerless notion to grasp complex realities of weakened social cohesion.

## A better understanding of radicalisation itself

Radicalisation therefore existed long before it became a category for public policies. The focus changes in the years 2012-2014; and the word is imposed in 2014 in the media, political discourse... The change is explained by :

- The importation of the idea already used in the Anglo-Saxon world (UK first plan in 2005 while in France 2014; there is the European Forum for Urban Security; there is the Centre for Radicalisation leading to Violence in Montreal ALVEOL pedagogical tool)
- Mohammed Merah's attacks in Toulouse in 2012: with children killed, the siege of more than 30 hours, a sounding board for the presidential election
- The departure to Syria, as if it was the shock of flight. I was told that it is "our children" who are leaving

- Creation of structures and tools, but the law does not know the crime of "radicalisation"

The idea of radicalisation is a category created by those who watch or even experience the phenomenon. It can help them in many situations, but also block them in many others.

Radicalisation is used to point out situations where the competency or expertise of common professionals can be challenged and, in that sense, can lead to their consolidation and the creation of new tools and orientation, depending on the background and professional culture. Educators can use it to tackle more efficiently some aspects of adolescent processes as quest for identity or risks of enrolment. In same time, educators have to keep attentive not to let the notion disqualify their own ethics and qualities, especially where there exist tensions that difficult their alliance with their public (ex: about religious thoughts and practices).

Radicalisation is a word that appear in floating situations, where the nature of the relation between the public and the professionals (security or socio-educational) is marked by uncertainty. This uncertainty can be about terrorist or violent acts threat, about sincerity during educational relation, about the very possibility to establish a relation, etc. When the doubt disappears, so usually does the term "radicalisation": one becomes a terrorist, a normal adolescent, a recruit for sectarian movements, etc. Orienting action toward radicalisation prevention, thus, can mean orienting actions toward ways to clarify tense or uncertain situations. From the experience of this seminar, the most efficient way to do it may be:

- Associating the labelled persons and groups
- Associating different professionals and persons who have relations of different natures with these persons and groups.

The evolution of actual situations would, in that way, involve more environmental aspects and the evaluation of situations get stronger and safer.



## Extremism, Radicalisation, Citizenship

Project N°:871092

### Analysis Report – 4

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# — Observatory: about social cohesion in Toulouse Métropole

With the present study we intend to describe social cohesion in four territories of Toulouse Métropole: La Reynerie, Vivier Maçon, Arnaud Bernard and Andromède. **Our basic assumption is that a high degree of social cohesion prevents violent radicalisation processes of the inhabitants.** By finding out more about social cohesion it should be possible to foster it and in the same time to find matching measures and policies that better help preventing violent radicalisation in these territories.

In the following sections we describe the theoretical and methodological approaches. Section 1 is dedicated to the relationship between social cohesion and extremism. In section 2 we define social cohesion, including some discrepancies between different understandings of the concept. Section 3 shows the categories that we use for the description of the state of social cohesion in the four territories. Finally, in section 4 the method of “rating” or better of evaluating the degree and the specific characteristics of social cohesion in the concerning territories will be developed.

## Why social cohesion? Social cohesion and extremism

In recent literature on “home-grown” extremism, the main reasons for radicalisation trajectories are supposed to be mainly located either in ideological offerings or in the social surroundings of young people (cf. Kaya 2020: 23).

Extremist ideologies are without doubt widely present, even in everyday life of youngsters, mainly spread through social media, sometimes by extremist recruiters. Social circumstances on the other hand have to do with the living conditions of people. Here, especially **recognition and participation** are important for the development of young people and the coping strategies they choose, if they experience deficits (Böhnisch 2017). Somebody who senses a lack of recognition and/or a feeling of powerlessness tends to search for groups that help him/her out of an unsatisfying situation, in the worst case with the result of distrusting or even abandoning democratic society. Social cohesion on the other hand helps to keep people within society.

But – depending on the understanding of the term – social cohesion may also foster radicalisation processes. If social cohesion is understood as **sense of belonging** to a more or less homogenous group, then it may be the motif to approximate an extremist group. This is especially the case for so-called followers, who – in contrast to the leaders of such groups – search for belonging and recognition – and: “such groups are characterized by a high level of social cohesion or solidarity” (Wintrobe 2006: 178)

Another aspect of the relation between social cohesion and extremism is the idea, that more extremism in a society lowers its degree of social cohesion (Ghosh et al. 2013). Here, social cohesion refers to the cohesion of the whole society not only of a smaller part – a community, an urban district etc. – within it. We agree with that understanding of the term – social cohesion is **a phenomenon that concerns the whole society** –, but we prefer to interpret the relationship between extremism and social cohesion the other way around: a lower degree of social cohesion enhances the danger of upcoming extremism. With the words of Ayhan Kaya: “The discriminatory, racist, nationalist, nativist and Islamophobic rhetoric towards ‘others’ poses a clear threat to democracy and social cohesion in Europe and beyond.” (Kaya 2020: 20) Discrimination, racism, nationalism, Islamophobia etc. as specific forms, – but also social exclusion in general or the perception of being excluded – threaten social cohesion and in the same time foster radicalisation processes.

A general motif with regard to the upcoming of social movements is so-called **defensive mobilization**. Defensive mobilization means: “A threat from outside induces the members of a group to pool their resources to fight of the enemy” (Kaya 2020: 6). In our case defensive mobilization towards collective radicalisation processes is related to experiences of discrimination (cf. Frounwelker et al. 2019) or to relative deprivation (cf. Miliopoulos 2018: 217-221) that both may be perceived as a threat by the persons concerned. Therefore, defensive mobilization may become an important driver of radicalization processes. In the same time, the term is a link between radicalisation processes and social cohesion. With other words: Social cohesion is an important condition and an important goal when it comes to reduce defensive mobilization towards undemocratic movements.

## What is social cohesion?

Social cohesion is considered desirable, especially in terms of achieving economic prosperity (e.g. "economic performance", Jenson 2010: 1). In the present context, however, the goal lies in its preventive effect against radicalisation. **A socially cohesive society is in some ways more resilient** to the rise of extremism, whether it comes from outside in the form of recruitment or propaganda, or develops from within, out of feelings of powerlessness and social exclusion.

The definition of social cohesion differs in literature and the concept often stays relatively vague, because it is not one solid phenomenon, but it consists of different factors, that in sum build up the theoretical construct. According to the Council of Europe social cohesion is the “capacity of a society to **ensure the well-being of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding marginalization**” (Council of Europe 2010, p. 2) As indicators it contains social and political attitudes, beliefs and values, rights and duties, social capital and social networks within (‘bonding’) and between milieus and social groups (‘bridging’) (Güntner 2009, p. 380). As mentioned before, socio-demographic “tendencies of social disintegration and the consolidation of material poverty in the cities” threaten social cohesion (Güntner 2009, p. 391, our translation).

Factors and indicators of social cohesion discussed in the literature are similar according to various approaches, but they also differ significantly in some cases.

A central difference lies in considerations that evaluate the cohesion within a community as solely positive. As discussed above this may be justified by means of its bonding quality, but if the regarding community as a whole has attitudes that endanger democracy, then cohesion may be high within the group, but it still endangers the social peace of society as a whole. Therefore, indicators that describe group identity are hardly relevant for us. Rather, it is values that promote democracy, such as **trust in democratic institutions**, to which we attach great importance with regard to social cohesion.


The factor "ethnic diversity" is often assessed as a threat to cohesion. This assumes that the cohesion of a society is endangered when people with different values come together. We consider this to be outdated with regard to democratic, pluralist, highly differentiated societies, or one could even say: "More recent work sees the constructive handling of divergent values as a prerequisite for cohesion" (Schiefer et al. 2012: 18/19, our translation). This does not mean that there is no friction between ethnic, cultural, and social groups. But what is essential for social cohesion is (1.) tolerance between the groups and (2.) the form of togetherness, the form of exchange and, under certain circumstances, of (constructive, political) dispute. **All this ultimately promotes tolerance and understanding for each other.** A related sociological model distinguishes a "mode of integration mediated through conflict" and an "integration mode of urban indifference" (Sutterlüty 2010: 213-235, our translation). In short this means, that communities that realize spaces of open (political) exchange and the occasion to struggle with each other, offer the higher chance for social cohesion as communities in which people live side by side, without knowing each other, and in which togetherness only on the surface is harmonious.

**Besides these details, literature agrees mostly on two main factors: social inclusion and social capital.**

Jenson (2010) presents social inclusion as one of the original dimensions of the concept that was applied in early versions like OECD (1997, see Jenson 2010: 4). With other words: social cohesion was considered a measure to prevent social exclusion (Jenson 2010: 5). This dimension includes certain factors like poverty, questions of distribution, or of social rights.

Another crucial element of social cohesion is social capital: "In an earlier overview of the literature, we observed an increasing tendency to define social cohesion as social capital or to use the two as synonyms" (Jenson 2010: 9). Social capital was very much understood according to Robert Putnam, who focused on institutions, organisations or associations that support inhabitants of a district and connect them which each other, or with important persons outside of their neighbourhoods (see discussion below in section 4).

Schiefer et al. summarize findings of a literature review about social cohesion in a graph. We show this overview here translated into English and in a simplified way. It seems to be surprising that social inclusion does not appear here. The reason might be, that social cohesion and social inclusion are understood as synonyms. On the right side of the graph, there is an overview of the main categories we apply in our survey. They are going to be described in the following section.



Not all of Schiefer's et al. categories are relevant for us. So, as mentioned above, shared values or sense of belonging are only partly appropriate for our understanding of social cohesion. Instead, we added some factors that seem to be important, like political factors (mainly: abstention), which are related to "shared values", or housing (i.e. social housing, rentals) and education which are related to questions of distribution (socio-economic factors).

## Indicators of our concept

It is worth noting that what we call "indicators" in the Rad2Citizen project is not meant to directly indicate if a territory, or a person is "radicalised" or even in a process of "radicalisation". Our objective is not actually to qualify a territory or categorise it. It is rather to give an insight, through **objective description (of facts and subjective experiences)** on specific issues that we consider constitute social cohesion as defined above. In sum, these indicators are to be understood as "clues" for a better understanding of social territorial dynamics that can foster or prevent the emergence of radical violences.

For the description of social cohesion in the four territories, we chose six main categories, each of them operationalized by various indicators.

The indicators consist of statistical data, mainly provided by the National Statistical Institute of France (INSEE) and the City of Toulouse. Since it is not possible, to describe each and every

category/indicator by statistical data, we decided to collect additional qualitative data. In the turn of the project we conducted **several interviews and focus group discussions** and **observed daily life** in the territories by means of an intense field work. We collected various perspectives from different stakeholders that all are relevant, but that may differ. E.g. one interviewee may perceive the situation in his/her neighbourhood as safe, whereas another one may describe experiences of insecurity in the same territory. Therefore, we take all the perspectives we gathered into account, always with respect to their relative character. In order to come to independent descriptions and estimations, we evaluated the statements and perspectives in an intersubjective assessment.<sup>1</sup>

In a first draft, the indicators were defined in a relatively narrow way with the intention to directly compare the territories – indicator by indicator. This is not problematic with regard to the statistical data. But when collecting the qualitative data, we realized that it is often not possible to find common indicators in a narrow sense. That is why the descriptions in some cases stay **as open as necessary (but as clear as possible)**. For “social capital” for example we differ between bridging, bonding and linking social capital. **Bonding capital is related to personal networks** between “similar” persons, while **bridging capital are connections between “different” persons**. **Linking social capital concerns institutions** like associations that foster bridges to relevant persons and other institution (cf. Claridge 2018). This distinction is useful in an analytical sense, anyway several questions come up with this decision (see discussion in section 4) and the different types can have totally different specifications. So, “bridging/linking” may be related to associations that bring together inhabitants of a territory (if the population is quite heterogenous), but it can also mean that it allows inhabitants to enter into contact with people living in territories abroad.

All of the factors we chose appear in similar ways in common literature (see literature overview in Schiefer 2012, section 2). The category “socio-economic factors” for example is related to social inclusion. Anyway, some of the factors are relatively uncommon. For the reasons explained in section 2, we decided not to highlight “shared values” in general, but only **values that foster tolerance between the inhabitants** of a territory or general trust in democratic institutions. Then, political factors seem important to us. The category consists in the first line of numbers, describing voters’ behaviours. Originally, we planned to integrate data about informal political activities like demonstrations, but on the scale of small urban territories it makes no sense to evaluate the degree of social cohesion in this manner, because participation in informal political activities in other places of the city may also be accessible for the inhabitants of an outer district. Finally, the main category “housing” seems to be somehow uncommon as an indicator for social cohesion. The operationalizations show, that it is mainly related to questions of contribution – insofar it matches social inclusion – and to public transport, which is highly significant for the bridging and/or linking social capital of a territory.

The following table shows the categories with concerning indicators:

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1 Besides regular team meetings, we conducted a “research working meeting” from 6<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> June 2022 at the FHS, where the participating researchers (Romain Bertrand, Heiko Berner, Markus Pausch, Nedžad Moćević) discussed and evaluated the complete data material.

Table 1: Overview of the main categories and indicators

Category	Indicator
Socio-economic factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Income average</li> <li>• Risk of Poverty</li> <li>• Single Parents</li> <li>• Unemployment</li> <li>• GINI Index</li> <li>• Level of education</li> </ul>
Housing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social housing</li> <li>• Prices, rentals</li> <li>• Ownership</li> <li>• Public transport</li> </ul>
Political factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Abstention (municipal and presidential)</li> <li>• Votes (municipal and presidential)</li> <li>• (Offerings that foster) participation</li> </ul>
Social capital and trust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bridging, bonding, linking social capital</li> <li>• Associations and</li> <li>• Trust in institutions</li> </ul>
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violence</li> <li>• Feelings of safety or insecurity</li> <li>• Incidents and occurrences fostering or threatening security</li> <li>• Relationship police-inhabitants</li> </ul>
Perspectives and identification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feelings of belonging</li> <li>• Experiences of exclusion and/or discrimination</li> </ul>

## The challenge of rating social cohesion

The evaluation of the factors and indicators we have used to describe social cohesion in the Toulouse territories is based on different approaches.

Most of the studies on social cohesion draw conclusions from the development of individual indicators: The value of an indicator has improved means that the territory concerned has become more cohesive. This method of evaluation is common and it is used in our study in relation to individual indicators.

**Rarely, however, are absolute benchmarks that require scientific or normative justification.** At what level of **unemployment**, for example, can a group be considered to be in danger of losing its cohesion? Which **abstention** rate indicates high, which one low social cohesion? Where possible, we have included such absolute thresholds in the assessment of individual indicators of social cohesion. These are then based on scientific evidence or on political settings, as they are shown in EU strategies.

A look at the UN's Sustainable Development Goals shows how difficult it is to justify such absolute thresholds. Under the dimension "**poverty**" (<https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/goal-01/>), the percentage of the population that is in employment and at the same time earns less than 1.90 euros per day is listed. Among the "least developed countries", the rate is about 30%. In contrast, the

global average is only 6.6%. However, we can expect that the working population of Toulouse Métropole generally earns more. The comparative value here is inappropriate. Rather, the average of Toulouse or France would be suitable as a benchmark. The example shows that even when setting absolute limits (at what value is an indicator considered to promote or endanger cohesion), the historical (temporal and spatial) context must be considered.

A well-known indicator is the **poverty risk**, which is based on the median of the total population (people with less than 60% of the median income are considered to be at risk of poverty). But the question also arises: from how many persons per hundred is the social cohesion of the community endangered? In a historical context, the EU report "Investing in Europe's future. Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion" (EC 2011), states:

“The share of population with an income level that puts them at risk of poverty (less than 60% of national median disposable income) also differs markedly between countries, ranging from one in four (in Romania) to one in 10 (in the Czech Republic). But the range is far wider at regional level: from around one in 17 in two Czech regions and Trento in Italy to more than one in three in three southern Italian regions, two Spanish and one Romanian region.” (EC 2011, S. XVI)

The figures for those at risk of poverty thus range from just under 6% in the richest to 33% in the poorest European regions. **This range can be used as a comparative value for the "at-risk-of-poverty" indicator. 33% would thus be considered a high risk of cohesion, while 6% can be interpreted as promoting cohesion.**

Another problem when rating the degree of social cohesion concerns the method of rating. In our first approach we intended to rate the state of social cohesion by numbers, applying a scale from 1 to 5 for each category. When analysing the data collection, we realized, that a rating by numbers often doesn't make sense. Two examples may illustrate the difficulties that come up with the rating of factors by numbers:

First, there is evidence that poverty alone is not fostering radicalisation. It is rather a huge **discrepancy of the distribution of income** or economic wealth (Vijaya et al. 2018). For this reason, the GINI-index, that exactly shows income discrepancies, might be a valuable factor that is able to contribute to the description of social capital and in the same time to the explanation of upcoming extremist attitudes in a community. In terms of the four territories it became clear that this reasoning is misleading: In Vivier Macon and in La Reynerie – both (parts of a) QPV – the GINI-index is quite low, which means that the incomes are well distributed. However, the average income situation is very low. In these cases, it does not make sense to conclude, that social cohesion is given to a high degree and the threat of growing radicalisation is low, just because of the low GINI index score. **The use of the GINI index would only be useful for our concerns if the territories were compared to others or to the whole of Toulouse.**

A second example concerns different forms of social capital. We may define social capital by distinguishing bonding and bridging social capital (cf. Granovetter 1985). Bonding capital are networks between “similar” people – similar in terms of equal identity or in terms of local proximity. Bridging capital on the other hand is related to the connection to people of different social groups or to people living in other districts. Especially associations may foster linkages

towards these “others”. Such organisations may also be considered as a third type of social capital, called linking capital (Woolcock 2001). But in this case again, things are not so simple as they seem to be on the first view.

When it comes to the question, if bridging or bonding capitals are “good” for a society and for social cohesion, we may assume that “important is the balance of bonding and bridging social capital. Neither is negative *per se* but can be negative depending on the balance and context.” (Claridge 2018: 3) As we stated above bonding capital within a community that shows a high degree of distrust in democratic institution may foster radicalisation processes. Too much bonding capital may even be a factor, that fosters such tendencies, because

“Networks with excessive levels of bonding tend to breed bias and racism, creating outgroups and exclusion. The Ku Klux Klan is often cited as an example of a group with high levels of bonding social capital that has negative outcomes.” (Claridge 2018: 3)

A further constraint arises with the question about the **homo-/heterogeneity of the territories**. Are they homogenous in themselves? Or do they show a certain degree of heterogeneity? Usually, modern urban societies have in common a relatively high degree of pluralism. That means that bridging capital may come up even within a territory. So, all in all we cannot easily judge the nature of relationships between inhabitants of a territory, or the value of associations in terms of their ability to foster bridging social capital without having a deeper look at their work and at the specific characteristics of the four territories.

For these reasons we decided not to rate the different states of social cohesions by means of numeric estimations, but we prefer in-detail-descriptions of the four territories and their individual state of social cohesion. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these territories? Is it more about economic perspectives or more about political participation at local level? What exactly are the forms of criminality in the different territories? Is gentrification and the fear of losing one’s home an issue?

These descriptions then can be used in order to develop the matching social and/or security measures that help to enhance social cohesion according to the specific need of each territory.

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# Evaluation of the analysis process

## Choice of the territories

The choice of territories is a crucial issue in planning an analysis and its relevance for understanding metropolitan dynamics in terms of radical violence. The 18 territories selected at the beginning of the project could not be explored, for reasons of resources and to ensure sufficient attention to the territories actually selected. These areas were all selected at the neighbourhood level, which is the most relevant level for analysing the dynamics of social cohesion and polarisation. Two principles governed their selection, and a third was added.

Firstly, we chose to avoid any stigmatisation of the QPVs, refusing to suggest that all vulnerabilities, risks and forms of radical violence are concentrated there. A balance therefore had to be found in order to be able to take into account areas in the QPV, which are generally integrated, residential areas with good commercial activity, but also non-QPV residential areas such as Amouroux or Balma, and areas that are more characterised by the uses made of the territory such as Arnaud Bernard.

The second principle was the metropolitan character of the project. We therefore selected both Toulouse and non-Toulousain, urban, peri-urban and rural areas, the latter having finally been abandoned for lack of resources.

These two principles were respected when narrowing down the choice of territories, which in the end included one Toulouse QPV, one non-Toulousain, one non-Toulousain QPV and one non-Toulousain.

The criterion that was in fact added is based on ethical principles and the needs of the analysis activity. From an ethical point of view, it is obviously the consent of the municipalities concerned. One of them, for example, refused to see the project deployed on its territory, fearing that the term 'radicalisation' would polarise its population. We understand and have respected this choice. In terms of analysis, it was necessary to find local relays and partners capable of helping us produce essentially qualitative data. Although some quantitative data could have been exchanged (electoral data outside Toulouse, security data, etc.), we preferred the approach based on the territory's experience. Thus, a municipality that showed interest in the principle of the action but was not able to give us the necessary time or to guide us in our search for actors was not finally retained. Many territories, however, had to be left out of the process out of spite.

## The evolution of the analysis method

As the reader will see from the various deliverables, the analysis method itself has evolved over the course of the project. These developments correspond to technical adaptations (e.g. difficulty in

finding a service provider to carry out a precise opinion survey at such fine scales) but also to conceptual adaptations. Indeed, the induction presented in deliverable D3.3.-3 implies a certain flexibility, and led us to adapt the analysis method to the modifications made by the field actors to the very object of our attention. For example, the focus on social cohesion rather than on radicalities themselves is a result of the difficulties in addressing the subject head-on. There are two reasons for this: on the one hand, the literature shows that the subject is particularly unstable, and this can destabilise our interlocutors, or even dissuade them from meeting us because they may not understand what we are discussing. On the other hand, the question of violence experienced requires some precautions, as does the question of stigmatising pre-supposedly radical populations. Precautions that may have been expressed by refusals. The methodology presented here is therefore the product of maturation throughout the project and is by no means definitive. It may, on the contrary, be defined by its flexibility.

## **A large amount of data but difficult to access or compare**

It was noticed quite early on that the work of INSEE and other data providers is very rich. Thus, the question was not so much to find data but to select and order them. If certain unavailable data were pointed out, it was because they were deemed particularly relevant for the analysis of social cohesion.

In addition, security data, which would have been of great help to us, were not provided by the competent authorities.

Another consequence of the multiplication of sources and data is the difficulty of comparing data and neighbourhoods. As mentioned in D3.6.-3 and D3.6.-4, IRIS, QPV, living quarters, municipalities and polling stations are not only different scales, but also rarely overlap. The precautions taken in this respect are essentially a warning to the reader, for want of a better word.

## **Local coordination hampered by service and competence logics**

Cross-cutting is a major challenge for many local authorities and public services. Toulouse Métropole is no exception to this limitation and, despite the involvement of two general directorates (security and solidarity) in the project, certain exchanges within or between the different departments were difficult. These difficulties concerned either difficulties in understanding the purpose of our work, or difficulties in understanding the relevance of the competences of the services required in this framework, or opposition to the mobilisation of these services.

Beyond Toulouse Métropole, the partnerships were generally very fruitful, particularly with certain municipalities, social centres, the national education system and the national health agency. Relations with the departmental prefecture, on the other hand, were difficult to clarify and the lack of commitment from this entity on a subject over which it has full competence had an impact on the progress of the project. Beyond the exchange of data, involvement in the project's activities or the prospect of future partnerships does not seem possible.

## An uneasy division of labour between FHS and TM

The partnership with the FHS has been particularly fruitful. However, the division of labour involving the production of data being entirely devolved to Toulouse Métropole for obvious reasons of accessibility has shown some limitations. Beyond the quantitative indicators, capturing the neighbourhood atmosphere and the nature of the environments was an important issue in the qualitative data production work. Transmitting these elements by video is extremely delicate. We therefore organised a seminar on this issue in Salzburg, but it probably came late, mainly because of the health crisis. Furthermore, a regular presence of the FHS team in the field with local partners and in focus groups would have been very positive.

## Radicalisation, radicalities, extremism, radical violences

Analysing radical trends is not a neutral starting point. It conveys specific bias and difficulties. First of all, radicalisation is firstly a security policies issue. Its emergence was due to the necessity, for security services all around the world, to better understand, tackle and prevent terrorist attacks as they evolved with globalisation. Radicalisation could be considered a mediation concepts aimed at helping practitioners and policy maker to widen their understanding of violence. However, there is no mechanical correlation between cognitive, behavioural radicalisation and terrorism or violent acts at large. Toulouse Metropole does not have any security competence. In order to resolve this first paradox, it was necessary to widen our understanding of radicalisation as affecting social cohesion.

Despite a wide multi-agency policy held at a national and departmental level, most practitioners do not use the term radicalisation in their daily practice. In the best cases, it does not appear as a useful or operant term to support individuals or territorial dynamics. In the worst cases, it is considered a stigmatising, if not directly Islamophobic word that tends to worsen discriminations and, thus polarisation processes. The shift to “radicalities” did not help, as it was clear that it was derivate from the former. In order to adapt to practitioners’ needs of efficiency and neutrality, we chose to focus directly on experiences of violence and social cohesion. This was, without a doubt, the only way to establish a communication with practitioners. Here are some of the spontaneous reactions we collected in the first steps of the presentation of the project:

**“Associations did not see what they could say about this, so they didn’t come”**

**“When we read your presentation about radicalisation, we weren’t going to attend, then you called and you clarified some points so we came.”**

**“When we talk about radicalisation, we shouldn’t talk only about the Islamic one!”**

**“We don’t want you to bring this term in this municipality, we already have problems of acceptance of new inhabitants because of their origins and religion, this will worsen our case”**

# — analysis synthesis: resources and vulnerabilities at a metropolitan scale

## Reminder of the indicators and their relevance at a metropolitan level

The indicators that we use for analysis have been already described and explained in former D3.3. and D3.6., so was Toulouse Metropole as a specific territory. Also, the indicators have been put into application at a very local scale along D3.6., and we have seen that some were particularly relevant to understanding the experience of the target neighbourhoods. Some other indicators, however, seemed more limited at the local level, but could make sense at the metropolitan level. This is particularly true for some quantitative indicators such as the Gini index, which reflects both social mix and inequality at the local level but which seems to lose its positive values if we measure not the cohabitation of social categories but rather their segregation. Other indicators that we had at our disposal were those of residential segregation provided by France Stratégie, which show in particular that most of this segregation is exponential as a function of the increase in income rather than the reverse, as we sometimes tend to believe when we work too closely on the QPVs or working-class neighbourhoods in general. The mechanisms of this segregation, moreover, must be understood in order to ensure the cohesion of the different social categories in a territory and avoid the phenomena of relative frustration or class warfare. Conceptual tools such as Pierre Bourdieu's 'distinction' or the urbanists' 'genrification' could help us. Other, more concrete tools, such as the rate of avoidance of the school map, allow us to better understand these logics and to act on them, as shown by the mixity project undertaken by the national education and the departmental council.

Concerning qualitative indicators, the relevance may again depend on the scale of observation. Biographical trajectories and the ability to build perspectives for the future, particularly through identification, are largely played out on a metropolitan scale and partly define functional areas that it is important to identify. Thus, population movements are not random. Foreigners (from outside Toulouse Metropole) tend to settle in the city centre, especially for short periods, whereas Toulouse residents who reach certain levels and stages of life prefer to settle in the nearby periphery: Tournefeuille, Blagnac, Balma, etc.

We will therefore take up the indicators here and give some elements at the metropolitan level. We will then insist on two elements that are not included in our indicators: mobility and some general considerations about social cohesion at large.

- Socio-economic factors
- Social Capital and access to services
- Perspectives and identification
- Security and crime
- Political factors

## Socio-economic factors

Toulouse is the 4<sup>th</sup> city in France in terms of population, and it is still growing. Toulouse Métropole is actually absorbing a great part of this growth and stimulates attractiveness thanks to dynamic economic sectors such as health research, tourism and obviously aeronautics. These characteristics boost Toulouse Métropole economy and life conditions in general with a median income at **23 090€**, which is far higher than the national median income (19 344€). However, its poverty rate (15,8%) is slightly higher than the national rate, and unemployment appears to be more than 5 points higher, with 14,7% in 2017.

These indicators, on a metropolitan scale, can only serve to measure a general trend and to identify ambiguities that deserve to be explored on other scales. But they also serve as a point of comparison that will serve to measure inequalities of income but also of risks or vulnerabilities according to the territories.

Another rather indirect factor regards housing. Here, we mainly used two numbers: the social housing rate and the rate of housing occupied by their owner. In Toulouse Métropole, 41.5% of the housing stock in the metropolis (2018) are owner-occupied primary residences. This is lower than the national rate, but the latter includes more rural areas where ownership depends on other dynamics as it does in the cities. At the same time, 13.2% of the inhabitants rent social housing. Although this figure may seem high, it is below the national average, particularly for large cities which are obliged, under the SRU law of 2000, to increase this rate to 20%.

But more than the percentage of social housing and owner-occupiers, it is their distribution that can inform us about the dynamics of social cohesion. Indeed, in the face of the effects of residential segregation driven by the highest incomes, there are pockets with very low rates of social housing, more balanced territories, and territories composed sometimes of up to 90% social housing. The latter cases show that the diversity targets can be boosted at the metropolitan level by the creation of pockets of poverty. Such areas can have many advantages, such as making it easier to group together services that are particularly necessary for the lowest income and most precarious populations. But they tend above all to generate forms of stigmatisation. The example of Vivier Maçon shows us that this does not automatically lead to issues of violence, but always to negative identification processes that weaken the relationship to institutions and to society in general.

Indeed, the case of Andromède showed us that stigma sometimes precedes the very existence of such phenomena. The concerns of the municipality regarding this new district were essentially

formulated in terms of the type of population in relation to the type of housing. While the neighbourhood built in the mid-2000s was supposed to accommodate a population of executives, the arrival of people with lower incomes and the services necessary for their life in the neighbourhood seems to weaken neighbourhood life.

Generally speaking, quantitative indicators are only the first step in an approach that should seek to understand the way in which the various actors and populations interact and, through their shared experience, make up the social fabric of an area.

From this point of view, the mention of the Mirail district, and in particular Reynerie and Bellefontaine, by many actors as a repulsive figure attracted our attention. In addition to feeding the stigma that affects the inhabitants of this district, these dynamics must be examined from the point of view of polarisation.

## **Social Capital, access to services and right to the city**

This part may be one of the blind spots of our analysis. Some services are necessary to provide at each territorial level, such as basic health, elementary education, administrative support and access to rights, but others could be more efficient and generating more “linking process” if centralised to make different people converge, which is the case of the city centre with leisure offer. At a metropolitan level, the total elucidation of these questions would require a complete analysis of mobilities: why and where do people leave their neighbourhood, in search of what type of resources? And how does that vary from a territory to another. Many discourses have been heard about the mobilities of inhabitants of different districts, but few objective data, and no systematic study are available. It would be interesting, for example, to know more about socialisation between youngsters from different districts in the city centre. It would also be of our interest to better understand the functional specialisation of the metropolis and how this can reinforce encounters with alterity, and generate diversity not only in objective terms, but also subjectively: how can we create or support encounter places in order to foster multiple identification processes?

## **Perspectives and identification**

Here again, the kind of quantitative data available seems to have a limited relevance at least at municipal level. Finer surveys on inhabitants' perceptions would be useful. Considering what a metropolis can offer in terms of perspectives would be a very interesting question, allowing us to widen our conception of the terms and to precise our understanding of the territory. Are some territories conceived as offering better perspectives than others? Are some of them a goal to live in? These questions made at a local level should let us see how the metropolis is articulated as a system in the way people conceive it in relation to their own past and future trajectories.

## Security and crime

In terms of security, or rather delinquency, the post-Covid transition from 2020 to 2021 sees most crimes and offences increase, and in particular those related to drug trafficking, which rise by +33.94%.

This increase is very unevenly distributed over the territory and the same crimes may affect certain areas differently. To work in more detail, we sought to analyse data that seemed particularly relevant. For example, offences against authority rose by 2.4% between 2020 and 2021, which could indicate a process of mistrust towards these authorities at least among part of the population. However, these figures should be read with parsimony as they may also reflect particular contexts, as the yellow waistcoats mobilisation may have been.

On the other hand, certain forms of violence are difficult to see in these figures because they are less often denounced or more insidious. Pressure and threats, particularly in the context of drug trafficking, but also gender-based violence, which is still difficult to count apart from femicide and serious domestic violence.

## Political factors

Let's start with the elections: like all other cities in France, Toulouse and its metropolis have seen a significant increase in abstention rates in recent years. With a 55.4% abstention rate in the first round of the 2020 municipal elections, Toulouse Metropole has more people entitled to vote and not doing so (since abstention only counts those registered who did not vote) than those who voted. However, we must be careful not to consider this indicator as clear and univocal because abstention can have multiple motivations as well as no motivation at all. It can signify disinterest as well as protest, against the candidates' choices or against the representative system itself.

Here again, a detailed analysis of the determinants of abstention would be of great help, but fortunately this indicator is not the only one available to us.

Amongst the results of votes, particularly in the municipal elections, close results between two ideologically very opposed candidates, as the two lists in the municipal elections were, should alert us. This means that there is tension between two currents that are not necessarily constituted in groups and do not necessarily consider themselves to be enemies in the full sense of the word, but are nevertheless opposed. The designation of the adversary by absolute terms such as "radicals" or "extremists", refuting its legitimacy to enter the game of democracy, must also question us.

## Mobility and functional analysis

It may seem obvious to write that mobility is a major challenge for a metropolis. However, this dimension appeared under different chapters of our analysis that have to be considered: daily mobility inside the metropolis defines functional areas in the metropolis with activity areas, residential areas, leisure areas, etc. Being able to understand the implications of these movement is

crucial in order to articulate some responses to social cohesion issues that can only be addressed at a metropolitan scale. The case of Andromède and Arnaud Bernard were interesting on this point as these two territories depend a lot on these movements. Andromède hosts a population that seems to use the public space at its minimum which makes it difficult to generate social cohesion at a district level. Arnaud Bernard on the contrary, is a very attractive leisure place with a lot of bars, restaurants and activities for people who do not live there and strongly impacts the social life.

Daily or casual mobility have also been used by professionals on priority areas as indicators. Interestingly, two different ways to approach this have been observed. In Reynerie, the fear of strong communities and enclosure on the territory lead some professional to push for more mobility of the residents out of the district. “They don’t get out of here” was a common phrase, especially among municipal agents. However, we should be attentive to consider this phrase as the manifestation of a concern and not exactly as a reality, as many social workers highlighted how common it was especially for youngsters to go to the centre or to other districts. At the same time, Reynerie provides all necessary services and facilities to its population, which allows a certain autonomy. The perspective was completely opposite in Vivier Macon, very near to the city centre of Cugneaux: the concern of both professionals and inhabitants was to get people from the centre to enter the Vivier, use its services and shops. An example of that was the pride expressed by inhabitants about the elementary school:

**“They don’t want to put their children here at the beginning  
and then they realise it’s the best school!”**

Of course, the proximity of the city centre and the size of both the municipality and the district are important factors to take into consideration. But getting more people to use Reynerie could be an interesting perspective, including regarding schooling.

Finally, we observe more long-term mobility, due to the combination of biographical trajectories, functional aspects of the different areas and the important demographic pressure. Toulouse hosts a lot of strangers, i.e. non Toulousains, and non-french population, thanks to its attractive offers in terms of study and employment. But as in any metropolis, Toulouse, and especially its city centre, are lived as transitional territories to gain diplomas and experience, and then be able to access to property in its periphery, usually cheaper and offering better life conditions. These movements are of great importance because they shape the type of engagements and attachments of the inhabitants. The transitional function of Reynerie could be one of the causes of high abstention rates, whereas the same function in Arnaud Bernard, for another type of population though (students), tend to shape specific political dynamics that are not necessarily district-centred but have a strong impact on the district dynamics.

## A metropolitan social cohesion? Democracy and diversity

The elements put forward so far allow us to draw some lines of work to articulate the issue of social cohesion at the level of the districts and the Metropolis. First of all, it should be taken into account that social cohesion cannot be an objective in itself. Throughout the analysis, we have stressed that we observe different forms of cohesion between bonding, bridging and linking phenomena. From then on, the question that needs to be asked is that of the form of democracy in its capacity to involve all citizens in a cohesive dynamic.

In D3.6, we focused on the neighbourhood scale and observed dynamics that are essentially about bonding and bridging, with associative movements, religious communities, more or less dense solidarity networks and their interconnections. We stressed the importance for institutions to ensure their presence and support for the most vulnerable people in order, in particular, to ensure good cohabitation between these groups. Finally, at the local level, we have studied the way in which multiple identifications with different groups can promote good understanding and limit violence. This was the case of the Vivier Maçon citizens' council, with its outreach strategy, but also, on another level, of the comments made by the inhabitants of Reynerie concerning the loss of regulation of drug trafficking in the district.

But on a metropolitan scale, these groups with strong cohesion and identity are more difficult to envisage in their specificities and interrelations. Beyond bonding and bridging, the Metropolis can be the space of linking, i.e. of identification with the general society and its integration mechanisms. Thus, the functional specialisation of certain areas may appear problematic on the scale of territories thought to be autonomous, such as the Andromède district, but these problems can be nuanced as soon as we take into account the way in which its inhabitants circulate and are part of wider logics.

The metropolitan scale appears in fact to be the most relevant for judging the impact of inequalities and democratic functioning. The stigma attached to the Reynerie is a strong example: if the district is much less isolated than the discourses that circulate about it assert, it is by observing the way it is perceived in other spaces and what the arrival of populations labelled as coming from the Mirail generates that we were able to understand the importance of these discourses on polarisation and the way in which social cohesion is affected. From this point of view, social diversity therefore corresponds both to issues of residential segregation and to the de facto co-presence of people with different sociologies and standards of living, but it refers first of all to the asymmetry with which certain social categories are considered according to their standard of living, their real or supposed origin or religion, their place of residence, etc.

What then can democracy do?

# Conclusion / Recommendations

The analysis reports aim at providing a better understanding of radicalisation phenomenon and its prevention on Toulouse Métropole territory. This first deliverable is fundamental as it brings the basis for a general analysis. First, we had to define the terms, shaping the object to be studied. It was not an easy task as radicalisation, extremism and citizenship can be thought in very different ways and all the partners brought different backgrounds. However, this diversity ended reinforcing the coherence of the project as it allowed us to start from a wide idea, narrowing it progressively through the concepts we presented on the first part of this report. As a result of our discussions, we chose to focus on indicators of polarisation at a local level as these indicators are considered to show the environmental conditions of the rise of radicalisation and extremism and its violent outputs.

## Analysing a territory for fostering democracy

The process that we implemented for analysis included inductive methodology. We presented this aspect in D3.3.-3. However, we would like to insist now on another aspect of induction when it is used on sensitive subjects directly with the concerned population: producing knowledge together with inhabitants includes an implicit agreement on the recognition of their experience. This agreement, for our purpose, may be at least as valuable as the analysis itself.

**“This may not lead anywhere, but I would like to thank you  
for listening to us”**

This sentence was told by an inhabitant at the end of a focus group and shows how impactful can be the simple act of being present and humble regarding the situations tackled. This, however, should be followed not only by public measures against insecurity and crime, but also to concrete responses to local concerns. On one hand, this process is necessary to maintain trust in institutions and support democracy in a more inclusive and direct way. On the other hand, one should keep attentive to every demand because most of them may regard democracy, social cohesion and even violence although implicitly. Claims for support in bringing new health professionals may seem to have no correlation with radical violence, but it is only in the process of understanding the causes and consequences of the absence of these professionals that we will be able to foster social cohesion in a democratic way. One may thus learn that medics in Reynerie use to suffer threats and disturbance from both desperate drug consumers and drug dealers looking for prescriptions. But one cannot forget that health is a fundamental right and a pillar for citizen's safety.

The first recommendation, thus would be to continue and **reinforce the dynamics of producing analysis and comprehension of the territory directly with inhabitants** and professionals from security, urban planning and social workers, because it is only in the crossing of these views that

fundamental issues and innovative solutions may appear, as the French policy of support for families and vulnerable people to radicalisation has shown. Resources for doing that already exist, and little impulse should be sufficient to improve their impact. **Local Comitees for Security and Crime Prevention (CLSPD) are a good example of cross-cutting features that could be reinforced** not only to discuss occurrences of violence or nuisance, but also to provide wider and more precise analysis of the root causes of the phenomenon observed on a long-term approach.

## Prevention actors on the territory

In fact, opposite to some narratives stating that QPV are “lost territories of the Republic”, we found on these territories resources that are strongest than in many other territories. The only territory explored where resources were really lacking may be Andromède, due to its recent emergence. The existence of many actors willing and working to have positive impacts on the territories really marked our analysis. These actors may be public or private, many of them are already supported by public funds, but a specific attention may be taken on potential concurrency dynamics that tend to oppose these actors instead of making them complementary. Coordination, however, may not be the best position as it implies a top-down approach where **the expertise often comes from the community itself.**

Many of these actors are focused on their territory. Facilitating connexions between them across the metropolitan areas could also help some of them find support directly from local actors that passed through similar processes and would be the most appropriate support.

## Research, documentation and training

One of the characteristics of Rad2citizen was also to bring a lot of academic actors and research to the field. The entry costs may seem high and “translations” may be necessary at the beginning of the process, but the association of front-line practitioners with researchers has shown its benefits both for boosting adaptation capacities of these professionals and to feed research with actual issues and grass-root trends.

**Partnerships with universities and researchers may thus be continued and reinforced** and work-time should be allowed to all professionals for documentation and training. This may have multiple effects: from the consolidation of professional positions on academic bases to orientation choices of their action to trends only visible through wider researches.